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Recent changes in the global rail industry:  
facing the challenge of increased flexibility 
 
Pedro Cantos1∗, Javier Campos2 
 
1 Departamento de Análisis Económico (Universidad de Valencia) 
2Departamento de Análisis Económico Aplicado (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria) 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper discusses how the current trend towards increased private participation in the rail industry is 
reshaping the way in which Governments should address the main regulatory challenges arising from the 
particular economic and technical characteristics of this industry. We review the role of railroads in the 
last two decades and examine the characteristics of the most relevant processes of private participation 
around the world. The lessons learned from these changes suggest that many of the traditional regulatory 
paradigms in this industry are being replaced by more flexible schemes of public intervention. Although 
this change does not fully preclude direct participation by the Government, it seems that the traditional 
monopolistic rail company is dead as the dominant model around the world, and new forms, such as 
franchises or concessions competing on the tracks are progressively gaining relevance. 
 
Keywords: Railways; Restructuring; Regulation; Privatization. 
 
 
1. What makes rail regulation different? 
 
The rail industry poses a number of specific problems for transport economists and 
regulators that are only partially shared with other transport modes. These elements are 
the multi-product nature of the activity, the particular cost structure of railroad 
companies, the role of infrastructure and networks, the existence of indivisibilities in 
inputs and outputs, the organization of rail transport as a public service, and the 
existence of externalities in the transport system as a whole. These characteristics define 
a descriptive framework for this sector, and jointly determine the main factors that 
should be considered when studying in detail the appropriate economic regulation for 
the rail industry. 
 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author: Pedro Cantos. Departamento de Análisis Económico (Universidad de Valencia). 
Campus dels Tarongers, s/n. 46022 Valencia (Spain). E-mail: Pedro.Cantos@uv.es. 
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1.1. The multi-product nature of the rail activity 
 
Rail companies are, in most cases, multi-product firms that provide different types of 
freight and passenger transport services. In the case of freight, along with the usual 
transport of bulk freight, rail operators also supply complete cargo wagons or trains, 
parcel and postal services, as well as other services of intermodal transport. In the case 
of passenger transport, long-distance traffic usually co-exists with local services 
(suburban and commuter trains), regional services, and in certain cases, even with high-
speed trains. 
The multi-product nature of railways has different implications. In accounting, for 
example, it is often difficult to allocate total operating costs among services. Many of 
the costs of running a long-distance train (including not only infrastructure costs but 
also variable costs) are shared by different types of traffic and these joint costs co-exist 
with other costs not affected by changes in output. For instance, the common costs of 
signal maintenance along a line section usually do not increase if the proportions of 
traffic of the different services change. Although some cost elements may be 
attributable to a particular traffic (for example, passengers), most of them (wagons, 
energy, staff, etc.) are not. Thus, cost interdependence requires simultaneous decisions 
on prices and services, which, in practice, makes any regulatory task much harder. 
At the cost level, another important aspect to consider in the multi-product setup of 
the rail industry is the sub-additivity of the cost function faced by a railroad.1 This idea 
conveys two relevant implications for the rail industry. First, is it more efficient for a 
single firm, rather than two separate firms, to supply both infrastructure and transport 
services? Second, if the infrastructure and services are separated, is the supply of such 
services more efficient within the context of a monopoly, or should two or more firms 
participate. This analysis, connected to the advantages and disadvantages of the 
separation of infrastructure from services, will be discussed in depth. 
 
 
1.2. The pervasive structure of railway costs 
 
Waters (1985) broadly distinguishes four railway cost categories: (i) train working 
costs, including the cost of providing transport services (fuel, crew, maintenance and 
depreciation of rolling stock); (ii) track and signalling costs (including operation, 
maintenance and depreciation of infrastructures); (iii) terminal and station costs; and 
finally, (iv), administration costs. 
The first two categories are prevalent in most companies and change according to 
several factors. Among train working costs, for example, rolling stock costs depend on 
both their number and the distance they run. Fuel costs depend on car-kilometres run for 
each type of vehicle, while train crew costs vary according to train-kilometres run. 
Track and signalling costs usually rely on the length of the route (since they typically 
request a single, standard-quality track). The amount of track and signalling needed, 
however, changes with the number of trains requiring paths, although this relationship is 
not constant. Terminal and station costs depend on traffic volumes, but vary 
considerably with the type of traffic. For instance, bulk freight handling requires more 
                                                 
1 According to Baumol (1977), a cost function is sub-additive when the provision of services by a single 
firm is more efficient (in terms of a lower unit cost) than the same production carried out by two or more 
companies. 
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terminal expenses than parcel services. Similarly, long distance passengers require more 
services (ticketing, reservations, luggage, etc.) than short distance users. Administration 
costs, finally, fluctuate depending on the overall size of the firm, although the precise 
nature of this dependence is generally difficult to determine. 
Allocating all of these costs to the multiple outputs or inputs it produces is complex. It 
often involves a degree of arbitrariness that demands, from a regulatory point of view, a 
clear distinction between avoidable and unavoidable costs. The avoidable costs are 
uniquely associated with a particular output: were this output not produced, no cost 
would be incurred. Avoidable costs may therefore be considered as a regulatory price 
floor (if any), since charging less would be equivalent to operating at an economic loss. 
 
 
1.3. The economic role of rail infrastructure 
 
Since the birth of the rail industry in the last century, mainstream economists have 
always considered that the larger the size of a railway company, the greater its 
efficiency. The existence of substantial fixed costs (particularly, those associated with 
infrastructure) traditionally led economists to assume the presence of important 
economies of scale, and thus to regard rail transport service as a textbook example of a 
natural monopoly.  
However, this notion has been heavily challenged in recent decades by the 
introduction of new ideas into the industry’s economic analysis. Particularly, the 
upheaval of the theory of contestable markets (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) 
contributed to clarifying the proper definition of the natural monopoly concept, in terms 
of the sub-additive cost function (see note 1). This concept implies that duplicating rail 
infrastructure is generally inefficient (and therefore is subject to natural monopoly 
conditions), but once the network has been deployed, the cost of operating rail transport 
services and rolling stock can be efficiently covered by more than one company, either 
as actual or potential competitors. 
Therefore, from the regulatory point of view, the conclusion is that infrastructure and 
services can be dealt with in different ways: the former, as a natural monopoly,2 but also 
as a potential provider of adequate access to any willing-to-serve operator; the latter, as 
any other competitive economic activity that could be provided by multiple competing 
operators or by a single firm under some sort of concession or license arrangement. 
 
 
1.4. The implications of asset indivisibilities 
 
Even though this potential vertical separation alleviates some of the natural monopoly 
problems, the rail industry remains very capital-intensive, with several other 
indivisibilities within its productive process. Specifically, the capital units (rolling 
stock, tracks and stations) can only be expanded in discrete, indivisible increments (the 
addition of a train or wagon, for example), while demand fluctuates in much smaller 
units. Consequently, increases (decreases) in supply can exceed increases (decreases) in 
demand, resulting in excess capacity. This lumpiness has several important implications 
for investment and pricing. For example, the transportation costs of an additional unit of 
                                                 
2 At least, when the infrastructure has not yet been built, although not necessarily after that moment. 
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traffic (freight or passengers) may be insignificant when there is idle capacity, but may 
become substantial when the capital is being used to its fullest. 
Firms can also be forced to employ fixed assets with differing economic lives, whose 
reliability spans over a large time horizon and heterogeneously affects the cost items 
described above, modifying investment decisions, and requiring a complete accounting 
and management information system. Therefore, dynamic price and output 
considerations become crucial in order to recover the real costs associated with each 
period of activity. 
A final implication of the indivisibilities in the rail industry’s capital assets is that 
innovation and infrastructure improvement projects are usually deferred and only 
carried out in small, discrete amounts. Railway firms seldom change the entire 
definition of their existing network, which in most countries corresponds to an inherited 
burden from past decades when the traffic structure was very different than today. 
Instead, they opt for partial renovations that often introduce technical asymmetries 
between tracks within a country or region, and accentuate indivisibilities and 
inflexibilities. 
 
 
1.5. The role of rail transport as a public service 
 
Although not derived from historical and organizational reasons and not from 
technical characteristics, the concept of rail transportation as a public or social service, 
irrespective of profitability, is another defining element that has determined the 
industry’s organization and performance around the world. The low rolling resistance of 
steel wheels on steel rails made railroad transportation extremely fuel efficient and 
relatively cheap. This allowed railroads to rapidly grow as the first mass transportation 
system, particularly for passengers, beginning in the years of the industrial revolution. 
For military and industrial reasons, some form of public control was envisaged in 
most countries, and many imposed their control by legal mandate. Public control over 
the rail industry occurred both with and without accompanying subsidies, public service 
obligations to transport providers in the form of compulsory (often unprofitable) routes, 
organized timetables or particular services for strategic products or areas. The ultimate 
reason behind this control, which remains the same today, is that this industry is 
regarded as an integral mechanism to overcome geographical barriers in certain areas, 
aid in the economic development of undeveloped zones, and even as a guarantee of 
minimum transport services for a particular segment of the population.  
 
 
1.6. Externalities and the rail system 
 
The policy goal of public service obligation is often supported by the idea that rail 
transportation contributes less to negative externalities than other transport modes, 
especially roads. There is abundant empirical evidence showing that under high demand 
conditions, the external costs of traffic congestion, accidents and environmental impact 
(noise, visual impact, pollution, etc.) could be reduced by transferring a substantial part 
of road traffic to rail. 
The current intermodal misallocation (more road users than rail users) arises from the 
fact that road transport does not fully internalize all of the social costs that it generates. 
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Economists often recommend the use of congestion and/or pollution rates to account for 
this. However, when these mechanisms are not feasible or politically viable, it might be 
preferable to decrease railway fares to improve the overall intermodal balance, which is 
an additional consideration for rail regulation. 
In summary, all of the above-mentioned characteristics suggest that an analysis of the 
regulation of railway transport should be carried out within a general context, taking 
into account the industry’s technological and organizational features, beginning with a 
detailed evaluation of recent performance. 
 
 
2. Recent regulatory trends in the global rail industry 
 
The overall evolution of rail transportation in recent years as compared to other 
transport modes is summarized in Table 1 for OECD countries. There was a substantial 
fall of the market share in both freight and passenger markets during the 1970s and 
1980s, which stabilized (even with a slight increase) during the last five years. In 
relative terms the decline is particularly relevant because it was during a period when 
the total volume in both markets grew about 50%, implying that the railroads were not 
able to take advantage of growing demand in these years. 
 
Table 1: Market shares of different transport modes (1970-2002). 
Passenger traffic  
1970 1980 1985 1991 1994 1998 2002 
Rail (%) 10.43 8.64 7.33 6.92 6.85 6.83 7.04 
Private car (%) 77.30 79.97 83.37 84.37 84.38 84.48 84.64 
Bus (%) 12.26 11.38 9.29 8.70 8.75 8.68 8.30 
Freight traffic  
1970 1980 1985 1991 1994 1998 2002 
Rail (%) 31.3 23.2 21.2 17.9 15.5 14.3 15.0 
Road (%) 55.2 65.9 69.3 74.0 76.2 78.5 77.6 
Waterways (%) 13.5 10.9 9.5 8.1 7.9 7.2 7.4 
Source: CEMT. Evolution des Transports. OECD Countries. 
 
The substantial reduction in market share is not particular to OECD countries but a 
common trend around the world. It can be attributed to both exogenous and endogenous 
causes. The former includes the rapid development of alternative modes of transport, 
especially road. For passengers, economic growth fostered the development of the 
automobile market, leading to enormous growth in motorization. In freight transport, 
the expanding, competitive trucking sector gained a growing percentage of transport in 
many countries. For example, in 1970 in Europe, there were 150 cars per 1,000 
inhabitants, a figure that now is 424. Similarly, the number of heavy vehicles and trucks 
increased from 7 to 20 million from 1970-2000. 
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The endogenous causes of the decline can be summarized in the inability of the sector 
to adapt to the changing conditions of the economic environment. Regulation remained 
obsolete and the rail industry was slow to react. The policies adopted during the 1980s, 
as described below, did not halt the steady loss of market share, the growing financial 
deficits, and in some countries, the impossibility of raising the low productivity indices 
of the industry. Thus, more radical restructuring processes were put into practice. 
 
 
2.1. The traditional railroad model 
 
During the past fifty years, the most common market structure in many countries’ rail 
sectors was a single, state-owned firm, entrusted with the unified management of both 
infrastructure and services. Despite some differences in their degree of commercial 
autonomy, the traditional methods of regulation and control of this sort of company 
have been relatively homogeneous. In general, it was assumed that the monopoly power 
of the national company required price and service regulation to protect the general 
interest. In addition, there was an obligation on the part of the companies to meet any 
demand at those prices. The closure of existing lines or the opening of new services 
required government approval. Thus, competition was rare and often discouraged, and 
the preservation of the national character of the industry was considered the key factor 
governing the overall regulatory system. 
Under this protective environment, most national rail companies incurred growing 
trade deficits during the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, social obligations to their staff 
made it nearly impossible to reach any agreement on redundancies or even wage 
adjustments. In some countries, the companies were forced to finance their deficits by 
borrowing, so their accounts lost all resemblance to reality. The main problems 
associated with the traditional policies for railways were: (i) increasing losses, which 
were usually financed by public subsidies; (ii) a high degree of managerial inefficiency; 
and (iii) business activities oriented exclusively toward production targets rather than 
commercial and market targets.3 
These distortions did not come from any artificial reduction in the range of services 
provided, nor from excessively high fares, but more commonly, from an unjustified 
increase in the supply of services (and hence, of costs). Such behaviour implied larger 
public subsidies. In many cases, the lack of commercially-oriented tariffs and 
investment policies explained many of the difficulties faced by the companies. Together 
with the burden imposed by the technical characteristics of the sector, this placed most 
railways in a very weak position to compete against alternative transport modes. 
However, fierce intermodal competition was not able to improve the competitiveness of 
the railway system by itself. It was necessary to adopt measures affecting the internal 
behaviour and structure of the sector itself. Therefore, the sector’s overall decline 
sparked a widespread restructuring movement around the world. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 On this point, Oum and Yu (1994) and Gathon and Pestieau (1995) have empirically shown that the 
companies that achieve the greatest efficiency were those that had been run with a higher level of 
autonomy and independence from state intervention. 
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2.2. Main features of the rail restructuring policies 
 
The worldwide restructuring process of the rail industry began with timid reforms. 
Many countries began by replacing their national railways with autonomous 
commercial bodies possessing independent, realistic balance-sheets, in which only 
public service obligations could be explicitly subsidized by the government. Other 
countries opted to substitute their old geographically-based management with a multi-
divisional structure, defined by the companies’ different lines of business or services.  
A common feature in most cases is that some countries have carried out a relatively 
long-term restructuring, whereas others have preferred a quicker implementation. For 
example, privatization in New Zealand and Japan was phased over several years, while 
Argentina and the United Kingdom took less than two years. Another common 
characteristic is that all restructuring processes were undertaken to make the companies 
attractive to private investors, although full privatization has been less preferred than 
concessioning. 
The changes have involved the revision of laws and other regulations affecting 
railways, reducing staff, dealing with pension issues, and deciding how much property 
should be sold and how much should be retained by the state. In addition, several 
arrangements for paying for unprofitable (but socially needed) train services were put 
into place, together with a precise definition of the concession contracts and their main 
terms.  
With regard to results, in general, most of the restructuring experiences detailed below 
seem to have been positive. The objectives of stopping the industry’s drain on the 
state’s resources, along with the stabilization of market share for both passengers and 
freight, were achieved in most countries. Likewise, the companies succeeded in raising 
their levels of productivity. 
 
 
3. New organizational models for the rail industry  
 
Despite all these changes, the most salient characteristic of the restructuring process 
of the rail industry in the last decades has been the consolidation of different and 
alternative organizational structures for the industry as a whole. These structures differ 
along three main features to be analyzed in detail: how are access and infrastructure and 
multimodal competition considered, what is the extent of vertical separation introduced 
after the change, and what is the amount of private participation allowed in the industry 
after the reform. 
 
 
3.1. Access to rail infrastructure and intermodal competition 
 
The management of rail infrastructure not only includes simple pricing principles, but 
also access rights and long-term development provisions. Each country addresses these 
differently: most have opted to publicly retain infrastructure, creating state management 
agencies (Sweden’s Banverket) to regulate private train operators (as in Argentina); 
others (France, Germany or Spain) have established nominally independent but state-
owned enterprises to manage stations and tracks. Only the United Kingdom privatized 
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infrastructure and operations in 1996, although part of the changes were later reverted in 
2001. The financial collapse of Railtrack (the private owner of the infrastructure) and 
the poor infrastructure maintenance (that provoked serious accidents and significant 
disruptions to service) were the main reasons to dissolve Railtrack and substitute it for a 
not for profit body, Network Rail. This suggests that, whether in public or private hands, 
rail infrastructure regulation must include minimum investment requirements to avoid 
short-term myopia and to ensure that key investments are prioritized over dividend 
increases or defence against potential takeover. 
On the other hand, the separation of infrastructure from services also implies that the 
new models should focus on the issue of access, which is particularly relevant in the 
case of highly integrated trans-national networks (as in Europe) or privately or publicly 
managed dense networks (as in the United States, Canada and some Asian countries). In 
the European Union, for example, Directive 91/440 directs each member state to grant 
international access and transit rights to international groups where stakes are held by 
railway undertakings in that or other member states. There have been no directives or 
resolutions related to domestic traffic, although the European Commission advocates 
the extension of these provisions to all freight and international passenger services. In 
January 2002 the Commission adopted a new communication: towards an integrated 
European railway area (known as the second railway package). Open access to the 
infrastructure for national services is promoted in order to completely open up the rail 
freight market. It has been agreed and open access in the domestic freight market will be 
introduced in 2007. However, open access in the passenger market is a much slower 
process.  
In the privatized structure of the United Kingdom, open access to passenger services 
has been limited by a number of provisions regarding that moderate competition. 
Initially designed to protect rail franchisees from new entrants and from each other, 
these provisions were anticipated to be gradually reduced over time. In other countries 
(Argentina and Côte d’Ivoire-Burkina Faso), access rights are also clearly specified in 
the contract. In certain large cities, like Mexico, D.F. or Buenos Aires, operators share a 
common network under a unique transport authority. 
The final aspect regarding access rights to rail infrastructure lies in the removal of 
existing or potential barriers to entry that might distort competition by favouring some 
competitors over others. These barriers also include technical requirements (for 
example, those related to incompatible rolling stock and tracks) and safety standards (in 
terms of a common minimum level). In summary, the general rule should be to promote 
open access as widely as possible once the separation between the natural monopoly 
infrastructure and train operations has been effectively achieved. However, this process 
must depend upon a detailed analysis of infrastructure costs and the prices charged to 
cover them. 
Barriers to entry are also related with intermodal competition. As already mentioned, 
modal choices can be heavily distorted due to different cost coverage ratios and the use 
of different cost input bases. A solution is to follow an integrated, multi-modal 
approach. Basic principles will have to apply to all transport operators, irrespective of 
the mode in which they operate. For example, in countries like Argentina and Chile, the 
extent of road freight transport competition was considered in designing the rail 
concession contracts. The general rule was that operators undertaking business at their 
own commercial and financial risk should not be at an undue disadvantage to those who 
enjoy public aid or indirectly benefit from huge externalities. 
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In the case of rail infrastructures, the principles envisaged to avoid these distortive 
effects should be solidified in the coordination of existing networks (particularly in 
dense rail areas) and the establishment of mechanisms that facilitate inter-operability 
and international links. However, not even the most advanced infrastructure regulations, 
such as the Swedish and the British systems, offer much help since they were conceived 
for a single-country environment. In other countries, such as Argentina before the 
restructuring process, railways attempted to solve national transport problems (by 
offering under-priced passenger services or subsidized low-quality freight transport). As 
a result, their financial performance rapidly deteriorated in an isolated framework. 
Therefore, the infrastructure pricing strategy in these areas should be compatible with 
the achievement of both local and international objectives, by establishing, if needed, a 
system of slot assignments in more congested corridors. 
 
 
3.2. The degree of vertical separation 
 
One of the most clearly defined patterns emerging from deregulation and restructuring 
is that they carry out two critical dimensions summarized in Table 2: the degree of 
vertical separation between infrastructure and services, and the involvement of private 
management in the sector. With respect to the first dimension, there are three main 
options for the vertical organization of the railway industry: (i) vertical integration, (ii) 
competitive access, and (iii) vertical separation.  
The first option corresponds to the traditional, historic model of railway organization 
described above, where a single (usually public) entity controls all the infrastructure 
facilities as well as the operating and administrative functions. Less frequent, 
competitive access is characterized by the existence of an integrated operator, who is 
required to make rail facilities (tracks, stations, etc.) available to other operators on a 
fair and equal basis through the trading of, for example, circulation rights. This has the 
advantages of integration (economies of scope, coordinated planning and reduction of 
transaction costs), but its overall effectiveness may be jeopardized if the integrated 
company has incentives to leave out other operators. 
Alternatively, in the complete vertical separation scenario, the management (and, 
possibly, the ownership) of facilities is fully separated from other rail functions. This is 
very attractive because although infrastructure may remain a natural monopoly, it is 
separated from rail services, where potential competition among different operators is 
possible. In general, the main advantage of this vertical unbundling is that rail transport 
is placed in a similar situation as road transport, especially regarding the tariff system 
and infrastructure planning. Governments could study investment proposals on the basis 
of a cost-benefit analysis, while pricing policies could be based on social cost.4 In 
addition, separating infrastructure from services greatly facilitates the entry of more 
than one operator on a single route. For profitable services this would permit notable 
                                                 
4 Note that an important problem here is the difficulty of defining the social cost of use of railway 
infrastructure. Determining the marginal or incremental costs of the use and wear and tear of one 
additional train is not, in principle, any more difficult than the equivalent calculation for road transport. 
The problem, however, is greatly complicated for the railway when this cost is evaluated in a congested 
environment. In pure economic terms, this cost is the opportunity cost of the stretch of track in question, 
but in practice, it is difficult to quantify this opportunity cost, especially if there is a mixture of social and 
commercial services. 
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improvements in efficiency by allowing direct competition among operators. For non-
profitable services, infrastructure separation can be accompanied by tendering, to 
stimulate increased efficiency through competition for the market, the introduction of 
innovations, and marketing improvements. 
 
Table 2: Alternative organizational structures for the rail industry. 
VERTICAL UNBUNDLING  
Total vertical integration Competitive access Vertical separation 
Government 
Department 
India, China, former socialist 
countries. 
Public Enterprise European railways 
 
Reformed Public 
Enterprise 
Many European railways at 
present 
 
Sweden 
Service Contract 
with Private 
Sector 
 
Japan (HSR) 
US (rolling stock) 
Pakistan (ticket sales) 
UK (rolling stock) 
Management 
Contract with 
Private Sector 
Nigeria (1980) US small railways 
Leasing to Private 
Sector 
Amtrak (USA) (track) 
VIA (Canada) (track) 
Japan (track) 
Cameroon (baggage) 
Leasing from 
Private Sector 
US and Europe (wagons and 
cars) 
 
Concession 
(franchising) 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cote 
d’Ivoire UK (passengers) 
Joint 
Venture 
 
Canada 
US (pipe and wire) UK 
PR
IV
A
TE
 P
A
R
TI
C
IP
A
TI
O
N
 
Private 
Company New Zealand Japan, US (Class I), Canada UK (freight, infrastructure) 
Source: Elaborated from Galenson and Thompson (1993). 
 
However, the vertical unbundling of the rail industry also implies several 
disadvantages. The main problem is the potential loss of economies of scope derived 
from the joint operation of tracks and services. It is often noted that the relationship 
between the services supplied and the rolling stock used, as well as the quality, quantity 
and technical characteristics of the infrastructure, is so close that both aspects need to be 
planned together. Thus, assigning different services to several operators may decrease 
the utilization of the sector’s staff and physical assets. Another negative factor is the 
higher risk that the new system becomes less attractive to the user than an integrated 
system.5 It is also mentioned that vertical separation requires such a complex 
institutional arrangement that the resulting transaction costs will be often prohibitive for 
many countries. A final disadvantage of vertical separation is the reduction of 
investment incentives. For example, an infrastructure owner considering an investment 
on a facility with only one potential buyer will anticipate bargaining away some of the 
benefit from the new service once it comes on line. This problem becomes less relevant 
with more competition in the market, since competition weakens the bargaining position 
of individual operators by reducing the specificity of the assets. 
                                                 
5 For example, because of the lack of interchangeable ticketing, an integrated national network, etc. 
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3.3. The amount of private participation 
 
With respect to the dimension of private participation in the industry, Galenson and 
Thompson (1993) provide a list (ordered in terms of increasing private participation) of 
the different situations that can be found in the world’s rail industry. The first situation 
is a government department, where the railroad is fully controlled and financed by the 
government and therefore subordinated to its interests. 
The second example is a public enterprise, where the railway is characterized by a 
higher managerial autonomy, but is still requires government approval for many 
decisions. Normally, these railways sign contracts (or have sectoral laws) with the 
government, specifying each party’s objectives and attributions and the financing rules. 
Similarly, the case of a reformed public enterprise corresponds to a situation where the 
railway is incorporated (into a shareholding company), commercialized (financially and 
managerially autonomous), and made subject to the country’s company law. However, 
the government, as the main owner, determines pricing policies and investment levels, 
while guaranteeing the supply of non-economical social services with the necessary 
subsidies. 
There are other situations that include mixed forms of cooperation between private 
and public capital. For example, rail service in some countries is provided through a 
service contract with the private sector, where, maintaining full ownership, 
governments or public enterprises can contract activities to be performed by private 
sector entities, including food catering, medical services, ticket sales, maintenance of 
physical assets, etc. Related to these there are management contracts with the private 
sector, where the contractor assumes responsibility for the operations and maintenance 
of certain activities. One variation is leasing to the private sector, where the contractor 
pays a fee for the use of the fixed assets. The lease contractor has more autonomy than 
in management contracts, controlling aspects such as the working capital and staff, but 
also assumes more risk. The owner maintains responsibility for investment and debt 
service. In many countries, locomotives and wagons are sold or leased to non-railway 
entities for transporting very specialized goods. 
Concessions are a broader form of lease where the contractor also agrees to make 
certain fixed investments and maintains the use of the assets for a longer period. This is 
currently the preferred restructuring method in the rail industry and will be extensively 
discussed in the rest of this chapter. Finally, joint ventures entail the largest degree of 
private participation. Private partners contribute development capital and planning and 
management expertise to develop land or other real estate owned by a railway. Also, 
under full private ownership, certain services or whole companies are operated by 
private firms. 
 
 
4. New regulatory scenarios for the rail industry 
 
The vertical separation/private participation bi-dimensional space discussed above 
creates a new regulatory framework in the rail sector whose most relevant characteristic 
is the flexibility. It introduces significant new roles and functions for the regulator and 
modifies the number of possible regulatory structures and models. In practice, choosing 
a particular method for railway restructuring depends on a number of particular 
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objectives or goals that the Government must balance according to the economic 
environment in which it operates.  
One of the first elements to consider is the existence of financial constraints. If they 
are important, the maximization of the proceeds obtained from the restructuring process 
will be a primary goal. A second element to consider is the pursuit of internal (or cost) 
efficiency in terms of providing services at the lowest possible cost, and therefore 
generating an efficient use of resources. Similarly, there is the goal of attaining 
allocative efficiency by setting optimal prices equal to the marginal social cost, which 
from an intermodal viewpoint, facilitates the best distribution of traffic. The objective of 
dynamic efficiency requires the long run minimization of cost through active, 
technology-improving investment policies. There can also be equity objectives, such as 
facilitating transport for all citizens, independent of income level. Finally, the 
government can also consider the optimal allocation of capacity, which favours 
management of railway capacity, coordination with other modes of transport, and 
overall minimization of risks in terms of service maintenance over time, risk of default, 
etc.  
Table 3: Different rail regulatory scenarios and their objectives. 
 Objectives 
Scenario Financial 
constraints 
Internal 
Efficiency 
External 
Efficiency 
Dynamic 
Efficiency 
Risk 
Minimizing 
Capacity 
Allocation Equity 
(1) Vertical Integration 
and 
Government 
Department 
– – + + + + + 
(2) Vertical Integration 
and 
reformed public 
enterprise 
– – + + + + + 
(3) Vertical Separation 
and 
Reformed public 
enterprise 
– – + + + – + 
(4) Competitive 
Access and 
Concession regime 
+ + + – + 
(5) Vertical separation 
and 
Concession regime 
+ + + 
 
unclear 
– + 
(6) Vertical integration 
and 
Private enterprise 
+ + – – + – 
(7) Competitive access 
and 
Private enterprise 
+ + – – – – 
(8) Vertical Separation 
and 
Private company 
+ + – 
 
 
 
 
unclear 
 
 
– – – 
Note. A “+” sign means that the objective is easily achievable within the corresponding scenario. The “–” 
sign implies the opposite. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the combination of these objectives, creating at least eight 
different possible regulatory scenarios, grouped in decreasing order of private 
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participation. Some additional scenarios, such as the mixed forms described above, have 
not been included.6 
It is important to note that the objectives could be given a different weight. For 
example, financial and cost efficiency objectives are now valued above all others, which 
explains the privatization boom, through concessions and direct sales to the private 
sector. In addition, as the degree of privatization increases, there is a trade-off between 
social and financial efficiency objectives. The public company scenarios serve social 
objectives (equity, reduction of risk on the service, intermodal coordination, etc.), but 
there are inefficient, leading to huge commercial deficits. As we have already indicated, 
this was the main reason for the restructuring of the sector. 
The deregulation measures that define scenarios 4 and 5 (concessions) have the 
advantage of favouring the efficiency and solvency of the companies, as well as 
reducing the state’s financial burden (although these effects are possibly not as great as 
with direct privatization). In addition, concession contracts allow the cushioning of 
some of the negative effects that may arise from the actions of the private company. 
Thus, it is habitual to establish maximum prices and minimum service levels so that 
impact on equity can be minimized. Likewise, many routes which, though not 
profitable, are beneficial from a social viewpoint can continue to be served: 
concessioning them to operators who request lower public subsidies meets both 
efficiency and equity objectives. 
In regard to dynamic efficiency, the first results of the investments implemented by 
the restructured companies or bodies are ambiguous. In Argentina, the investment levels 
of some operators have been below those foreseen in their concession contracts, though 
at the aggregate level, investment levels seem to have improved. Something similar has 
occurred with some passenger franchises in the United Kingdom. At any rate, the 
effective investment levels should be compared with those that existed in the regulated 
context. In this sense, other experiences have indeed led to a substantial recovery in 
investments in both infrastructure and rolling stock, as well as an improvement in 
service quality. In other countries, such as Japan, privatization does not seem to have 
slowed the technological development of the railway industry (Fujimori, 1997).  
Apart from other considerations, operational risks are minimized when entrusted to a 
public enterprise. With a private company, there is obviously a greater risk of closure of 
certain services, or of larger instability. Again, concession systems allow the risks 
inherent to the action of private enterprise to be reduced.  
Finally, the problem associated with managing capacity is easily eliminated in the 
case of vertically integrated companies, although this is not so simple for systems of 
competitive access or separation. In this case, the problem is increased for companies 
with high traffic densities and conflicting capacity demands. Modern computer 
technology can reduce the problem through real-time management of electronic 
systems, but when connecting systems have different informational qualities and 
dispatching priorities it is very difficult for anyone to plan and manage integrated 
services across several systems. 
                                                 
6 This is because many of these forms of private participation are related to very specific services (e.g., 
the case of service or management contracts) and on occasions some of the forms of contracting (e.g., 
leasing) are very similar to those established in a concession or franchising system. 
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5. The role of concession contracts in the rail industry 
 
In spite of the number of potential regulatory scenarios just described, few railways 
around the world have been fully privatized. Instead, most countries have opted to 
concession rail services and even rail infrastructures in some cases, to private firms in 
exchange for a fixed payment. This has been the favoured form of restructuring because 
it allows the government to retain ultimate control over the assets while the private 
sector carries out day-to-day operations according to pre-specified rules devised in a 
contract that transforms the problems associated with traditional regulation into issues 
of contract enforcement.7 
Since there are many variables to consider, rail concession contracts cannot be 
reduced into a single standard model. However, according to existing experiences, 
Table 4 proposes four key variables to consider. 
 
Table 4: Some key variables in rail concession contracts design. 
 
 
Type 
of 
contract 
Package size depends on economies of scale/scope and existing potential for 
competition 
Horizontal concessions (geographic) according to country’s characteristics 
Vertical concessions (functional) according to network’s characteristics (including 
current state of infrastructure and new investment needed) 
Mixed packages depending on profitability and bidders’ financial constraints 
Freight vs. passenger concessions depending on relative traffic shares  
 
 
Award 
and 
duration 
Pre-qualification requirements to reduce risks 
Type of auction (sealed, one-shot) and explicit rules for auctioning 
Selection based on government’s objectives (fiscal, equity or efficiency) 
Short periods (favour competition; diminish investment incentives) versus long periods 
(favour investment; diminish enforceability) 
Termination: re-auction preferable to automatic renewal 
 
 
Operating 
general contents 
Concessionaire: 
    obligations: services (with adequate performance) and payments 
    rights: exclusivity and compensation for public service obligations 
Government: 
    risk sharing (net cost/gross cost mechanisms) 
    asset ownership rules 
Regulation 
mechanisms 
Price control rules (services and infrastructure) 
Principles regarding price discrimination and cross-subsidization 
Definition of quality targets and quality control 
Issues regarding safety and externalities 
 
The first critical aspect of a concession is determining its type, both in vertical 
(functional) size and horizontal (geographical) size. Recent concessions in the rail 
                                                 
7 The list of countries with actual or planned rail concessions include, among others, United Kingdom, 
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Côte d’Ivoire-Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Congo, Malawi, Jordan and Mozambique. 
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industry have created smaller horizontal packages throughout the country. For example, 
rail freight systems in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia were split into several 
regional companies, and Chilean railways were broken down into four passenger 
companies and two freight companies with a separate infrastructure firm. All of these 
countries also used economic criteria to design the size of the concessioning package, 
accounting for the profitability of different lines.  
In Europe, functional separation between infrastructure and services has been 
preferred, especially after European Commission Directive 91/440. At its most extreme, 
this form of concessioning was used in the privatization of British Rail, which also 
included the private provision and management of rail infrastructures. A less extensive 
vertical separation has been developed in Sweden and other European countries, where 
infrastructure has not been auctioned off to private firms (Lundberg, 1996). However 
the debate about the advantages and disadvantages of the separation of infrastructure 
and operations is not closed. There is a perception that separation is an essential 
condition for non discriminatory access, and that it is very difficult to increase 
competition in a situation in which the major operator controls the infrastructure. But 
the problems of British process have increased the doubts about its advisability. Nash 
(2004) points that perhaps the Swedish model, combining a stated-owned infrastructure 
entity and a charging based on short run marginal cost, is the system that has worked 
with best results in Europe.  
The second key issue in designing rail service and infrastructure concession contracts 
is defining the award process and duration of the concession. This includes the auction 
rules and, particularly, the criteria defining how each concession will be awarded to a 
private operator. There are a number of possibilities to choose from as the award criteria 
(for example, maximum payment to government or minimum tariff). There is also a 
choice between unrestricted bidding and bidding that could involve some pre-selection 
(see Guislain and Kerf, 1995, and Kerf et al., 1997). In the privatization of the former 
British Rail, for example, the concession process began with a pre-qualification stage, 
followed by a formal invitation to tender for a particular package. After indicative bids 
were received, four bidders were short-listed. One of these was subsequently named the 
preferred bidder, and was given a fortnight to complete financing and other 
organizational arrangements before being confirmed as the winner. At that point, the 
regulator gave public details of the bid, in terms of the required subsidy and promised 
service improvements. 
With respect to bidding mechanisms, there is extensive literature on experiences and 
results in different auction forms. Single, sealed-envelope bids is the simplest, avoiding 
collusion and obtaining higher bids. However, more complex approaches, such as real-
time auctions, have been used in some transport concessions. Once the rules have been 
set up and the bids requested, bidders should have a study period to form their own 
evaluation of the potential gains to be extracted from the concession. Early research by 
Preston et al. (1996) for the United Kingdom indicated that key issues for bidders were 
the length of franchises, the level of competition they would face from other operators, 
the separation of infrastructure from services, the costs (including new investments) 
associated with maintenance and the selection criteria for the bidding process. 
Although the guiding principle should be to maximize competition so that the most 
efficient firm ends up winning the award, it is clear that there is no single method for 
selecting the winner once bids have been submitted. The final choice depends on the 
Government’s objectives, which should be explicit and built on transparent criteria. 
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Thus, if the government intends private participation to be a means of reducing the 
burden on the public sector, it must use fiscal benefits as the main criterion, looking at 
who requires the lowest subsidy or who offers the highest auction price. In Brazil, for 
example, the six regional rail concessions were successfully auctioned to the highest bid 
above the Government’s minimum price. Concessionaires were required to make an up-
front payment immediately after the auction, followed by a stream of pre-determined 
payments over the life of the concession. Similarly, in Britain, minimizing subsidy 
payments appeared to drive the regulator’s choice of bidders, especially in the first 
concessions. Other criteria were the financial position of the tenderer, its managerial 
competence and its operational proposals. 
Alternatively, if tariffs and quality of service are defined in the contract, bids can be 
evaluated on the basis of the lower cost provider, simultaneously including penalties for 
not achieving certain performance objectives. Social objectives can be also targeted by 
focusing on the bids that propose to monopolize the industry for the lowest number of 
years or to charge the lowest fare to final users. Sometimes, as in the case of rail freight, 
the traffic mix makes the price structure very complex, so that this mechanism becomes 
impractical. Moreover, using tariffs as an award criterion for rail concessions limits the 
later possibility of regulatory intervention in prices and demands an adequate definition 
of quality standards.  
Many concessions in the rail industry have been awarded using formulas with 
multiple criteria, which can account for a larger number of objectives. For example in 
Argentina, the bids for the six freight packages that were concessioned were evaluated 
using the net present value of the canon to be paid to the government during the first 
fifteen years of the concession, the quality of business and investment plans, staffing 
levels, the proposed track fee for passenger trains, and the share of Argentine interest in 
the consortium. The weights of these criteria reflected both the importance attributed to 
investment in the railways and political compromises on employment. However, for the 
award of metropolitan commuter railways, the Argentinean authorities kept things 
simpler to make the bidding process and final selection as transparent as possible. They 
learned from the freight concession that selecting the winning bid through numerous 
cumbersome criteria with discretional weights was more likely to reduce the efficiency 
of the bidding process than to improve it. Instead, the terms of the concession should be 
made clear to all potential bidders and bidding should take place on the basis of a single 
parameter encompassed in the bidders’ economic assumptions in terms of the 
concession.8 
With regard to the optimal duration of the concession contract, the trade-off is evident 
in terms of efficiency, since the shorter the concession, the more immediate the 
competitive pressure, but the lower the incentive to invest and develop the business. 
Longer concessions, in contrast, tend to diminish the regulator’s enforcement capacity 
and soften the incentives to promote efficient outcomes. The general rule is to adapt the 
concession period to the economic life of the assets and to make this compatible with 
the government’s objectives. This balance often creates conflict: while concessionaires 
generally argue for long contracts that provide them with incentives to build up the 
business and purchase or replace long-lived assets, concessioning authorities prefer 
shorter lengths to favour the achievement of efficiency (by the implicit threat of not 
                                                 
8 In the case of the metropolitan railway concession, for instance, each concessionaire calculated her 
expected revenue from operations, then compared it with the capital investment programs and finally 
estimated the subsidy amount to be requested (The World Bank, 1996). 
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renewal) and fiscal goals (since the canon or auction price may be increased after the 
first few years of the concession). Only if sunk investments are minimal and asset 
reutilization is possible, are shorter periods advisable for particular rail services (those 
related to signals, track and station maintenance). 
Shaw, Gwilliam and Thompson (1996) point out that the average duration of a rail 
service concession is five to ten years, increasing up to thirty when network investment 
and development are included. In Argentina, for example, the six freight packages were 
concessioned on a thirty year term, with an optional ten year extension, due to the poor 
state of infrastructure and the huge investment that was required. For similar reasons, 
the international rail link between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso was awarded in a 
fifteen year concession. Conversely, train operating companies in the United Kingdom 
were granted a concession to run passenger services for a period of only seven to fifteen 
years. 
After the duration period has expired, the contract must also specify several 
termination arrangements to avoid any disruption in services. One possibility is to make 
automatic renewals in case new candidates for the concession do not exist. The 
regulator should not compromise on this before the concession ends in order to ensure 
that the incumbent has the correct incentives. New auctioning seems to be the standard 
procedure after a concession has ended, but most rail operators will seek a renegotiation 
of duration terms while the contract is still in force. Examples of this strategy are some 
United Kingdom rail franchises who argued that they made long-lived investments in 
high-quality wagons and locomotives when they asked for a license extension. 
Since renegotiation costs money, but a lack of renegotiation might cause performance 
deterioration, concession contracts should specify the circumstances for renegotiation, 
and which party should initiate the process. If intermediate objectives are achieved, a 
pre-scheduled revision process might help to reduce both parties’ risks. Although the 
contract will always be incomplete, standard clauses should include behaviour in 
unforeseen changes in demand conditions, responses to unanticipated rises in energy or 
labour costs, etc. For example in Argentina, freight concessions could not fulfil their 
promise to invest $1.2 billion in the rail network over fifteen years due to unexpected 
falling traffic levels. 
A flexible contract renegotiation mechanism is a good idea in any case since the 
Government may face the dilemma of enforcing contracts to the detriment of the 
operating companies and the national rail system or rescheduling investment and 
making other compromises at the cost of undermining his credibility for enforcing 
future agreements (Carbajo and Estache, 1996). 
This is why one of the most critical issues in designing a rail concession contract is 
the attribution of rights and obligations to the parties. On one side, the private operator 
pays a regular canon or receives a subsidy and is awarded the right to operate train 
services and/or manage its infrastructure (including future investments) with (total or 
partial) exclusivity rights that protect her from other competitors. On the other hand, in 
exchange for the payment or the compensating subsidy, there is a regulatory activity by 
means of which the overall performance of the sector is monitored and a stable 
framework for current and future rail operations is provided. 
These operations may include infrastructure provisions if they were auctioned off to 
private firms. In fact, a large part of railway activities might be concessioned. These 
include infrastructure: track, signals, stations, yards and shops; operating equipment: 
locomotives, wagons, carriages; and general service access to track, route and schedule 
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information and maintenance. The exact form in which this process is developed in 
practice depends on the parties’ risk sharing agreements. According to a service 
contract, for example, train operators provide rail transport services for passengers or 
(rarely) freight according to specific routes, levels of quality and technology as 
established by the regulator. The operators may cover some investment costs and carry 
some commercial risk, which can be integrated into a net cost contract, where the 
operator keeps all revenues generated by passenger or freight traffic. This type of 
contract, where the operator carries revenue as well as cost risk, often generates more 
traffic and is let to the most attractive bid, but offers a higher incentive to predate. 
Alternatively, gross cost contracts specify that all revenue accrues to the government 
and the contracts are let on the basis of the least total cost supplier so operators carry 
cost but not revenue risk. The experience in the United Kingdom with regard to 
passenger franchises suggests that gross cost contracts generate more bids per tender 
(particularly from new entrants), offer greater incentives to public revenue generation, 
reduce the administrative cost for the regulatory authority, and support any fare scheme 
with modal integration and quality control. 
The regulator may retain control over and responsibility for common functions, and 
its main roles should be restricted to regulating quality (in terms of service, safety, 
environmental and technical standards), controlling monopolistic behaviour (in terms of 
abusive prices or services), and determining the overall characteristics of the function of 
the sector (in terms of coordination at the national and international level) according to 
established the competition rules or rights and anti-trust and commercial legislation. 
The implementation of rail concession exclusivity rights varies in each country. In 
Argentina, freight concessionaires have exclusive use of tracks but must grant access to 
passenger operations in return for a compensatory track fee. In Chile, passenger services 
and infrastructure initially remained in public hands, while freight concessions were 
awarded to private competing firms. The fifteen-year concession for the Côte d’Ivoire-
Burkina Faso trans-national railway was awarded with a seven year exclusivity period, 
after which the operator should grant access to third-parties specified by the regulator 
for an agreed fee. Thus, exclusivity rights should be viewed as another instrument for 
regulatory control, and not taken for granted by the firms ex-ante. Limiting the duration 
of the monopoly period balances the regulator’s desire to reap the benefits of 
competitive access to the tracks and the private train operators’ preference for full 
control of the market to generate profit and facilitate revenue forecasting. In general, 
most railways have been concessioned on an exclusive basis in geographical areas, as in 
Argentina or Brazil, possibly with some access rights for connecting railways to certain 
central or strategic track segments. This has been due to the geopolitical configuration 
of the country, the density of the existing network, and the need to promote competition 
in major markets (as in Mexico) or for non-competing services (such as passenger 
services on freight tracks in Chile). 
With respect to the concessionaires’ obligations, the private provision of rail transport 
services, particularly in less developed areas or zones with a structural lack of network, 
cannot always be separated from public subsidization or reciprocal compensation for 
politically motivated public service obligations. Arrangements for these loss-making but 
socially necessary services must be included in concession contracts, in terms of 
detailed performance levels to be attained by the firm, possibly even be designed to be 
awarded to the company willing to provide the specified services for the lowest level of 
subsidy (negative concessions), as in Argentina. 
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A final feature of defining the rights and obligations of the concessionaires, the 
current experience of rail concessions in South America shows that restructuring has 
often lowered employment levels. This is, in practice, one of the toughest obstacles 
hindering the private participation process in certain countries and often requires 
difficult political decisions. In Brazil, for example, large redundancies were inevitable 
and were dealt with in two phases. Before concessioning, incentive schemes for early 
retirements were in place; after the concession was awarded, the former national rail 
operator paid involuntary separation grants to the remaining staff not hired by the 
concessionaire. After that point, compensation for additional laid off employees is the 
responsibility of the private operator. Undoubtedly, any such employment constraints 
will be reflected in the auction price of the concession. 
In summary, in their general form, rail concessions are the most advantageous 
solution to the challenges posed by the current regulatory environment of the rail 
industry. It usually adopts the form of a long or medium term contract where a 
vertically or horizontally integrated package of (passenger and/or freight) rail services is 
auctioned off to private firms, while economic assets remain public property. Three of 
its key features – type, duration and contents – have been described in this section, but 
there are other particular aspects of the concession contract design in the rail industry 
that, based on their importance, deserve a more detailed treatment. These include price 
regulation, in terms of defining the most important issues in establishing effective and 
well-oriented price control mechanisms; quality regulation, in both its static dimension 
(quality of service, safety and environmental issues) and dynamic dimension (rules for 
infrastructure investment and financing), and coordination between infrastructure and 
superstructure. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The increasing role of private sector in the rail industry is one of the most relevant 
characteristics of the evolution of this industry in recent years. This change is reshaping 
the way in which Governments are addressing the main regulatory challenges derived 
from the economic and technical characteristics of railways. 
In this paper we have showed that the industry regulation is moving accordingly 
towards more flexible schemes of public intervention. Although this does not fully 
preclude direct participation by the Government, it seems that the monopolistic rail 
company is progressively disappearing as the dominant model around the world. There 
is no unique form of rail regulation to address these new challenges, but the general rule 
is to maintain flexibility and simplicity whenever possible.  
Two key issues in the new regulatory environment of the rail industry are that private 
participation is included in license contracts and the organization of the industry is 
adapted to each country’s needs and characteristics. In turn, the use of these 
mechanisms also changes the role of the rail regulator, whose actions should now be 
governed by principles that foster competition and market mechanisms and 
simultaneously provide a stable legal and institutional framework for economic activity. 
The regulator should refrain from intervention unless the ultimate goal of achieving 
economic efficiency subject to the socially demanded level of equity is in jeopardy. 
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Nevertheless, two important caveats for future regulation must be taken into account. 
First, the process of privatization chosen in each country depends on the basic 
objectives sought: to maintain an industry with one operator or a small number of 
operators, or to facilitate a process of competition on the track. Second, legacies from 
the traditional mechanisms of regulation should be avoided. In particular, high debt 
levels and overstaffing are two common problems that must be dealt with before 
starting any privatization policy. 
In any case, future researches will be necessary to evaluate the advantages and 
difficulties of the current rail restructuring processes in the world. Some of these costs 
and benefits have been described in the paper. The new regulatory schemes will be 
essential in order to preserve the advantages of these new rail systems and to reduce its 
potential problems and costs. 
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Abstract 
 
The changes faced by the global rail industry in recent years have brought a redefinition of some of the 
traditional regulatory instruments available in this sector. This paper, focusing on price and quality 
regulation, discusses how these instruments have been applied in several countries where private sector 
participation in railways has been introduced mainly through concession contracts, and where some form 
of vertical and/or horizontal unbundling has been implemented. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After enjoying an unchallenged position for more than 100 years as the dominant 
means of transport, the rail industry has globally faced a dramatic change both in terms 
of economic relevance and organizational structure during the last decades. The decline 
of the railways has been partially explained by the government involvement in its 
management and the pervasive effects of an obsolete regulatory framework, which 
impeded, or at least slowed, the necessary adaptation to a changing environment 
dominated by more flexible transport alternatives. 
Narrowly classified as natural monopolies since the XIX century, railways’ 
management around the world widely relied on an undisputed model based on a 
vertically integrated firm, heavily protected from competition which acted as a national 
provider of a public service and received generous support from the Government. With 
very few exceptions, this was the paradigm until the 1980s, when a series of reforms, in 
the UK, Chile, New Zealand or Japan proved that competition could be introduced in 
this model through horizontal and/or vertical unbundling, and the subsequent increase in 
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private participation in the provision of services and, although less successfully, in the 
management of infrastructure. 
Within the traditional railway model, pricing and quality decisions were heavily 
regulated and political interference in managerial decisions often affected these aspects 
of the railway companies. In fact, pricing rules were relatively simple: in most cases the 
overall scheme was characterized by maximum prices with little connection with costs, 
combined with cross subsidization, through which some profitable services pay above 
their avoidable costs maintaining unprofitable services paying below their avoidable 
costs. Subsidies, not necessarily associated to public service obligations completed the 
picture. With respect to quality, few commercial provisions were in practice, since the 
Government-owned nature of most companies prevented them from making a real effort 
on improving this issue. 
For these reasons, the main aim of this paper is to discuss some of the new regulatory 
instruments on price and quality regulation that have recently become of common use in 
the countries which have opted for a change in their railway organizational paradigm. In 
section 2, we will first review the principles behind the price regulation mechanisms 
governing the provision of (mostly, passenger) services in a context of a possibly 
unbundled rail industry company enjoying a significant degree of private participation 
(usually, through a concession contract). In section 3, we specifically study in detail two 
of the major problems arising in the regulation of rail infrastructure, provision and 
access. Finally, since tariff controls can easily be cheated on quality grounds, quality 
requirements become essential for monitoring overall performance of rail 
concessionaires. We thus address the issue of quality regulation, including safety 
concerns in section 4; this includes not only the adequate definition of quality targets, 
but also a review of the most relevant mechanisms for quality control currently used in 
the rail industry. The final section describes some performance indicators that could be 
applied to monitor the behaviour of the regulated rail companies, thus providing a useful 
device aimed at moving from the definition of the regulation theoretical principles to the 
problem of how to implement them. 
 
 
2. Price regulation of rail services: principles and mechanisms 
 
According to standard economic principles, prices for rail transport services should 
match the opportunity cost of providing it in order to make the most efficient use of the 
economy’s resources. This is the economic efficiency or first best criterion which has 
defined the traditional regulation of the rail industry during the last fifty years. The main 
focus of government regulation was controlling market power by setting prices that 
limited the monopolistic abuse of any particular railroad. The exact form of tariff 
control (official approval of rates with little or no degree of financial autonomy) in each 
case depended on the nature of the industry, the ownership of the assets, the complexity 
of the regulated service, and the social and political pressures to maintain financial 
equilibrium in the medium and long run. 
In practice, however, opportunity cost pricing implies some measurement difficulties 
and often conveys economic losses, especially in industries with large economies of 
scale (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994). Therefore, this form of regulation was 
complemented by a number of standard price mechanisms that economic theorists 
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devised to substitute the ideal efficiency criterion of pricing each unit of service at the 
exact cost of its provision.  
Price discrimination policies, either by type (student and senior prices, frequent 
traveller and commuter passes), number of consumers (group discounts), type or 
volume of freight (cargo rebates for some goods) or time of day or season (peak-load 
prices), have always been common in transport. The use of two-part tariffs, with fixed 
and variable components, is also a common tariff policy in which each unit of 
consumption (for example, a single trip) is priced differently. These mechanisms allow 
greater flexibility for railways and increase revenues without a great effect on costs. 
However, their social acceptability and information requirements can limit the extent of 
their application. 
In the new regulatory environment defined by the changes experienced in the rail 
industry since the 1980s, where separation of the infrastructure from services has been 
widely implemented in diverse forms, and a notable degree of private participation in 
rail management exists through, for example, concession contracts, pricing principles 
must be put into practice by means of concrete rules within the contract itself. 
In general, as private operators, rail concessionaires are allowed to set prices 
relatively freely, price regulation has a different nature: instead of price-setting, it 
becomes more price-supervision. To carry out this task, most concession contracts 
awarded in the rail industry (for example, in Argentina or Brazil) routinely include a 
specific procedure to control and evaluate the prices set by operators. These price 
control mechanisms are generally set according to three key factors: (i) the degree of 
monopoly power effectively conferred to the operator; (ii) the extent of government 
non-commercial objectives in the concession award procedure; and (iii) the possible 
existence of other limiting factors, such as intermodal competition. This latter element is 
relevant in rail freight operations (intermodal competition from trucking), but in the 
case of passenger traffic (especially commuter and regional), social pressure for low 
fares usually dominates many price interventions. In practice, the most common 
alternatives (second best criteria) for price control in rail concessions adopt the form of 
a rate of return regulation or a price cap mechanism. 
 
 
2.1. Rate of return mechanisms 
 
Rate of return regulation is used in railroads in Canada, Japan and the United States. 
The principle behind this type of regulation is to constrain prices so that the regulated 
rail transport operator earns only a fair rate of return on its capital investment. The 
regulator typically determines a revenue requirement based on a firm’s total costs 
during a test year, according to the variable costs and an estimate of the cost of capital 
to the firm, given by a “reasonable” rate level multiplied by a base rate (Liston, 1997).  
Thus, rate of return regulation has three components: the base rate, the allowed rate 
level, and the rate structure. The base rate refers to the investments that are allowed to 
earn a rate of return, the rate level refers to the relation of overall revenues to costs, and 
the rate structure determines how individual prices are set for different services or 
customers. Determining the first of these three components is often the most important 
regulatory task under this form of regulation, since inadequate calculations of the base 
rate may either jeopardize the survival of the firm or allow it to earn excessive profits. 
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In practice, the base rate usually includes most fixed costs less depreciation and working 
capital. 
Three characteristics should govern the definition of the asset base rate. First, with 
respect to the treatment of past investments carried out by the railroad before the 
regulatory period,1 it should be consistent and transparent in order to ensure that assets 
are not expropriated ex post by opportunistic regulatory behaviour, which would 
increase the cost of capital required by investors. Second, with future investments and 
expected operating expenditures and costs should be considered in the asset base 
definition inasmuch as they do not imply “excessive” investment and only when they 
are fully incorporated into the firm. Finally, with respect to current investments, a 
problem lies in determining the value of the firm’s capital. If the existing assets were 
transferable to other activities without cost, then the conceptual problem of determining 
their value would be simple: their replacement cost or resale value. At the other 
extreme, and more frequent in the rail industry, is that existing assets are sunk, so the 
opportunity cost of using them in their present activity is zero. If the regulator seeks 
maximum efficiency, it should ensure that the rate of return structure (and, indirectly, 
the prices) are set to cover future avoidable costs. 
Since most of the assets currently used by railways are financed before the 
concessioning process, both of these solutions are troublesome. Market values are much 
lower than replacement costs so this valuation would yield large price increases and 
windfall gains for private shareholders at the expense of consumers. On the other hand, 
in attributing a zero value to the existing assets, windfall gains would go in the opposite 
direction and the proprietors would be reluctant to finance future investments with such 
a lower real return. A possible way to address this problem is to use some average 
procedure that considers either a financial projection of what will happen with the future 
base rate or calculates indicative values by estimating the cash flows that the firm would 
have earned had the regulatory regime remain unchanged. 
Despite its advantages within the traditional price regulation mechanisms (mainly its 
simplicity), three additional problems are associated with this sort of regulation. First, 
there is little incentive for productive efficiency, since firms can pass production costs 
on to final users in the form of higher prices; second, it leads to excessive investment 
and capital use because the firm is guaranteed a return on investment;2 and, finally, the 
high degree of discretion enjoyed by the regulator in determining the base rate and the 
rate of return reduces the incentive for rent-seeking behaviour on the part of the 
regulated firm. 
 
 
2.2. Price cap regulation mechanisms 
 
The most common alternative to the standard rate of return regulation is the use of 
cost-plus incentives that, in practice, take the form of a menu of cost reimbursement 
rules that firms themselves select according to their preferences for sharing operating 
costs with the regulator. The basic aim of these mechanisms is the achievement of 
dynamic efficiency (in the sense of the regulated firm achieving the lowest unit cost in 
                                                 
1 This is often the case in many restructuring processes when a former state-owned railway transfers its 
assets to private concessionaires. 
2 This is the so-called Averch-Johnson or capital-bias effect, which is not particularly adverse in less 
developed economies whose capital needs are seldom fulfilled. 
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the long run) by sharing some of the efficiency improvement rents between the firm and 
the regulator.3 
Alternatively, price cap regulation is another incentive used in both railways and other 
privatized utilities. In its most standard form, it consists of setting traditional maximum 
price schemes based on long-run marginal costs in order to offer a firm an incentive to 
achieve the goal of dynamic efficiency while maintaining all or part of the gains 
associated with the firm’s future increases in efficiency. This mechanism came as a 
consequence of the criticism directed at the lack of cost minimization embedded in rate 
of return regulation and other traditional price regulation mechanisms. However, its 
efficiency gains have to be balanced with the higher information rents that it implies. 
There are a number of minor variations of the price cap system. In the rail industry, 
one of the most developed is the RPI-X formula. In this setup, the price for a basket of 
the firm’s prices can increase in any one year by no more than the increase in the retail 
price index (RPI) for that year, minus some fixed-cost (efficiency related) parameter X. 
In the case of multi-product activities, such as railways output, this expression can be 
easily adapted by requiring that a certain weighted average of percentage price increases 
not exceed the rate of growth of the RPI less X percent. The weight for each price can 
be defined according to the share in total revenue of each product or, alternatively, it 
can be imposed that the average revenue (calculated with accounting figures) can grow 
at most by RPI-X. Thus, the regulator can control the prices of multi-product firms by 
focusing on their revenues and correcting them according to adequate weights. It starts 
with a reference price, often calculated with rate of return criteria, and set the price for a 
fixed number of years. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the price cap mechanism, in its RPI-X formula, 
has been applied to passenger traffic franchises. Commuter fares are regulated with 
respect to a basket containing all relevant fares, weighed broadly by the income that the 
operator derives from each. For three years from January 1996, increases in the capped 
fares are not permitted to be more than the retail price index increase from the 1995 
base price; after January 1999, the price cap was set at RPI-1%. 
The goal of this method is to increase the efficiency of the regulated rail operator, 
allowing the firm to earn substantial profits by improving efficiency while 
simultaneously financing current and future operations. This implies that, in practice, 
when setting the level of a price cap, the rail regulator must consider several factors: the 
cost of capital, the value of the existing assets, future investment programs, expected 
changes in productivity, estimates of demand growth, and, perhaps, the effect of X on 
actual and potential competitors. Some of these are common to other price regulation 
mechanisms and, in particular, they are needed when using rate of return regulation, as 
described above. 
There are different procedures and rules to deal with each mechanism. The cost of 
capital and the value of existing assets are calculated using standard financial 
techniques. The future investment program and its implications depends on both 
expected changes in productivity and estimated demand that can be obtained from 
econometric techniques or simpler projection and analysis of historical data. Finally, the 
                                                 
3 There are several ways to accomplish this goal and implement its results. For example, the sliding scale 
plans used in the United Kingdom’s Railtrack regulation consist of a price adjustment mechanism through 
which the actual rate of return earned by the firm is adapted to changes in productivity according to a 
variable parameter. 
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effect of the price cap on the future shape of the market is conjectured from past 
experiences or yardstick comparisons. 
One of the most critical issues is the setting and resetting of the productivity X-factor. 
A possible method consists of using indexes or indicators (as described below) to 
measure the difference between aggregate rates of growth of outputs and inputs and 
therefore calculate productivity from the residual. Econometrics also provides 
alternatives for estimating cost functions and their corresponding productivity 
parameters. Once the X-factor is determined, the initial price ceiling that is imposed on 
the firm after a switch of regime is critical. If the caps are too high, then too little 
surplus is transferred to consumers and deadweight losses are huge. If they are set too 
low, the firm may not be able to break even and may then have difficulty attracting 
capital, leading to a deterioration of quality of service. 
Another important element of RPI-X regulation is the existence of cost pass-through 
provisions, through which the firm can transfer to customers unexpected increases in 
certain factors outside of its control. Although these clauses are standard in the 
regulation of other utilities, they are not in the rail industry. The most plausible case 
could be given by energy costs, for which a certain percentage (100% or less) of the 
cost pass-through onto customers could be established in the concession contract. 
 
 
3. Regulation and rail infrastructure 
 
After reviewing the principles and mechanisms of price regulation for rail services, 
this section addresses the two most relevant problems of infrastructure regulation 
nowadays in a context of vertical unbundling and private participation. We first focus 
on the recovery cost problem and then study the issue of access pricing. 
 
 
3.1. How to recover infrastructure costs? 
 
Rail infrastructure provision and management are characterized by a high ratio of 
fixed to marginal costs, the existence of avoidable costs and unavoidable or common 
costs. Avoidable costs are uniquely associated with a particular output: if this output is 
not produced, no cost is incurred. This guiding principle relates to the idea of cost 
recovery for particular outputs. Avoidable costs may thus be considered as a floor to 
regulated prices (if any), since charging less than the avoidable cost is equivalent to 
operating at an economic loss. This makes standard pricing rules inoperable in this 
sector, since first best or efficient principles of marginal cost pricing may result in large 
deficits that jeopardize the long run survival of the firm. Three particular problems then 
arise with respect to the allocation of the rail infrastructure costs: cross-subsidization 
issues, cost-recovery problems, and the possibility of setting inefficient prices (Talley, 
1988). 
The existence of cross-subsidization problems in pricing rail services or infrastructure 
produced in the presence of common costs can be illustrated with the case of a profit-
regulated railroad connecting two large cities and also providing rail service to a smaller 
town along the route between the two cities. The fares charged for passage from the 
small town generate revenues exceeding the additional cost of serving it, such as 
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ticketing and station costs, but not sufficient to cover an equal or proportionate 
(however defined) share of the common costs, such as trackage, signalling, and 
trainyard costs. The issue is how to allocate common costs among customers and 
services. In many cases, cost sub-additivity and efficiency require joint production and 
allocation of fixed costs among all services, without cross-subsidization (accounting for 
externalities whenever present). 
Cross-subsidization is not only an equity problem for rail services, as in this example, 
but also a relevant issue for efficient pricing of infrastructure like railbeds, signals or 
stations. The standard procedure is the so-called fully distributed costs method, under 
which common costs are allocated on the basis of some common measure of utilization, 
such as gross tons/km, or other measure of relative output or gross revenue. 
Alternatively, common costs can also be allocated in proportion to costs that can be 
directly assigned to the various services (Braeutigam, 1989). The arbitrary nature of 
fully distributed cost methods and its lack of a conceptual foundation have been 
criticized, but they remain a useful measure for recovering common costs.  
However, the treatment of the cross-subsidization problem should not be based on 
excessively rigid criteria, particularly for developing countries with few alternative 
finance mechanisms. The analysis should be made on a case-by-case basis, since, for 
example, stand-alone cost tests do not apply if railroads are not allowed to abandon 
unremunerative facilities or services (Kessides and Willig, 1995). If that freedom is 
denied, a railroad cannot earn adequate revenues if its rates on potentially remunerative 
activities are constrained by stand-alone cost ceilings.  
The cost recovery principle should be a central issue in the design of any rail 
infrastructure pricing procedure. The theoretical and political debate focuses on two 
options. Many public firms still advocate the use of the efficient price mechanisms and 
propose marginal cost rules with the simultaneous use of public subsidies to cover fixed 
costs. Alternatively, a growing literature patronizes the use of full cost recovery prices, 
including price discrimination, multiple part tariffs or cross-subsidization schemes, if 
needed. Although it is thought that it might yield inefficient outcomes for the theoretical 
efficiency principles, it constitutes the second best available alternative in most cases. 
Similarly, with respect to access pricing of a rail network, it is clear that it should be 
based on marginal cost pricing rules in a first best world. In practice, however, the 
achievement of this objective is difficult due to at least three reasons: the above 
described cost structure of the rail network, which cannot always be recovered with 
simple price rules; the asymmetric information problem faced by the regulator with 
respect to these costs; and the subsidy level that can be sustained in the long-run. 
Several econometric studies have shown that in the case of the rail industry, the 
marginal cost of those railways that are still vertically integrated lies in the range of 
60%-70% of average cost; where rail services are separated from infrastructure, the 
marginal social cost of rail infrastructure alone often is well below the 60%-70% range 
(see, for example, Friedlander et al., 1993). Price discrimination, if feasible and 
politically acceptable, may help to raise cost recovery to around 60% of total cost 
without driving demand off the market. Thus, full cost recovery would require a further 
price mark-up of more than 60% above the efficient price. Alternative proposals, in 
terms of the so-called Ramsey pricing principle, have been defended for infrastructures 
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with high fixed costs and low marginal costs.4 However, they rarely work in practice, 
since they arouse consumers’ suspicions of unfair treatment and undue discrimination. 
Moreover, under Ramsey pricing rules all unattributable fixed and common costs are 
apportioned on the basis of the services’ demand characteristics.  
In the current debate, a reasonable conclusion is to advocate a balance between the 
cost recovery issue and the efficient pricing rules, giving preferential treatment to one or 
the other according to the case. However, the issue remains unsolved and depends on 
how different countries have faced their access pricing problem. Whether a country’s 
government is willing to assume these differences or not is, in most cases, a political 
question. In many cases, the ultimate challenge is how to price access to rail 
infrastructure in a transparent, efficient and non-discriminatory way. In Europe, for 
example, Directive 95/19 requires infrastructure managers to balance revenues with 
expenditures. In countries where revenues from operations and compensation from 
government for public service obligations are insufficient to provide a surplus for 
depreciation and investment, railways will be dependent on the state to fund or 
guarantee repayment of investment loans. This continues to be the case in many of the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
3.2. The access pricing question 
 
The development of tariffs for accessing rail infrastructure varies greatly among 
different countries according to the stage of their railway restructuring process. Some 
countries have already identified procedures for setting fees, and a number of them have 
laid down precise rules for the structure and level of fees. In others, business unit or 
infrastructure companies (either in public or private hands) are responsible for setting 
charges. In fact, access charges are mostly relevant in countries where traditional 
railroads have been vertically unbundled by the separation of the potentially competitive 
area of service operations from the naturally monopolistic area of infrastructure 
management. 
Apart from the already discussed problem of cost recovery, access pricing may create 
a market structure problem regarding its effects on competition and barriers to entry. 
This problem arises in network industries where a single, vertically integrated dominant 
firm (either private or public) controls the supply of a key input (in this case, railway 
tracks) to its competitors. It is obvious that in these cases, there are incentives for the 
firm to set prices high to raise rivals’ costs, but it could also be the case in which the 
regulator sets access prices too low in order to favour the entrants. 
Depending on the discretion allowed to the integrated firm, potentially distortive 
effects on access prices can be determined in several ways. First, when infrastructure is 
still publicly owned or managed, the regulator can determine the price as an integral 
part of the access terms defined in a contract with one of several private train operators. 
Secondly, the regulator may allow the firm to choose from a menu of alternative 
regulatory schemes, usually rooted in incentive-based price regulation mechanisms (to 
favour the firm that achieves higher levels of efficiency). Thirdly, the firm may have 
discretion over aspects of access pricing subject to some overall regulatory constraint, 
                                                 
4 Ramsey pricing refers to charging higher prices above unit costs to more inelastic market segments. 
When infrastructure and services are separated, their use becomes more complicated and still is not 
clearly solved, since different demands for services – as well as for tracks – must be estimated. 
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and finally, the firm may have full discretion over the price and is only restricted by the 
country’s anti-trust law. 
In all of these cases, there are two main approaches to setting access prices when the 
principles of cost recovery plus the normal rate of return are required. First, some 
countries use the current dominant paradigm for setting access charges: cost-related 
charges, which are based on the optimal first-best principle of pricing according to 
marginal cost (considered the forward-looking long-run incremental cost). The higher 
the proportion of common costs, the more complex the principle. It is based on the so-
called efficient-component rule, which determines that optimal access charge is equal to 
the direct cost plus the opportunity cost of providing access (given by the reduction in 
the dominant firm’s profit). To compute these costs, the regulator has to consider 
economic depreciation (physical depreciation plus technological progress) and forecast 
future usage. 
The first problem to be solved is that of the actual value of capital assets: nominal 
value versus potential to generate cash. While the latter is clearly a function of the 
privatization and regulation methods and the extent of competition envisaged in bidding 
for the right to operate concessioned infrastructure services, the former is more likely to 
reflect a past situation that domestic reforms are trying to overcome. 
The second method of setting access prices consists of developing usage-related 
charges. Once-avoidable costs are covered by increasing prices that are inversely related 
to demand elasticity. Another option (less controversial) is the use of a two-part tariff to 
avoid service cuts by train operators to save charges even when the network has no cost 
saving. The British infrastructure provider until 2001, Railtrack, is a well-studied 
example of how access prices functioned in practice. In a industry context where 
operating companies were franchised, Railtrack managed the infrastructure (track, 
signalling systems, electric power supply and stations) and was responsible for its 
maintenance, new investments and train operations (timetables, coordination, etc.). It 
also sold access to infrastructure to passenger and freight operators.  
Railtrack owned the rail network and set track charges that had to be agreed upon 
with the rail regulator under the criteria openly published in a number of regulatory 
policy statements. The price control system operated through a simple RPI-X formula 
that was revised every five years, remaining fixed between revisions. The structure of 
Railtrack’s access charges for passenger services was based on the usage-related 
charges and was made up of multiple-part tariffs with at least four elements. First, track 
usage charges, which tend to reflect short run effects on maintenance and the renewal 
costs of running trains of different types for different distances. Second, traction current 
charges, to recover the costs of electric current, varying geographically and temporally 
and reflecting distance covered and type of vehicle. Third, the long run incremental 
cost, which indicated the long run costs imposed on Railtrack in delivering the total 
access rights of a train operator. Finally, common costs, as the remainder of the fixed 
charge, designed to recover the rest of Railtrack’s costs at the sub-zonal, zonal or 
national level. This was apportioned among train operators on the basis of budgeted 
passenger vehicle miles for sub-zonal costs and budgeted passenger revenue for zonal 
and national costs. The first two elements amounted on average to only about 9% of 
total track access charges, and given the current structure of charges, these were the 
only elements that vary directly. The remaining 91% of the aggregate charge was in the 
form of a fixed charge, which did not vary with the number or type of trains run or with 
passenger revenue. 
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In the case of freight services, access prices were more flexible. The rail regulator had 
simply established several principles to be considered by Railtrack in its relationship 
with private operators. First, prices must cover the avoidable costs incurred by Railtrack 
as a direct result of carrying that particular freight flow; second, prices must be lower 
than the stand-alone cost that would be incurred by a national efficient competitor; third, 
no undue discriminatory charges are possible; and finally, charge structure should 
reflect the value to users of access to the rail network and enable Railtrack recover its 
total cost 
As opposed to the British case, the setting of access charges in other European 
countries is still underdeveloped. In 1995, the European Union passed two directives 
concerning the application of Directive 91/440 on the separation of infrastructure 
management and transport operations. Directive 95/18 regulated the licensing of railway 
undertakings, and Directive 95/19 established several general principles on the 
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and infrastructure fee charges. These 
principles were designed to ensure an optimum, non-discriminatory use of infrastructure 
and guarantee an access charging policy according to EC rules, but they were received 
by member states with various degrees of enthusiasm. The objective of most 
governments that have set rules for infrastructure fees is to cover costs and differentiate 
fees to reflect different cost factors. In 2001 a new rail package clarified the principles 
on which rail infrastructure management should be based on and, very recently, through 
EC Directive 2004/51, the deadlines for implementing ‘third party access’ have been 
shortened (to January 2007). However, many of these changes have been slowly 
implemented in most countries. 
In France, for example, several principles were introduced to give access to railway 
infrastructure to licensed international groupings of transport services and operators of 
combined transport, but present arrangements seem more inclined to promote 
conventional international rail groupings rather than new entrants into the rail market. 
With centrally planned timetables, only the domestic operator pays a fixed amount to 
the (also public) infrastructure manager. User fees are fixed, accounting for a wide set 
of criteria including: infrastructure costs, the transport market situation, supply and 
demand characteristics, imperatives based on optimized use, and standard conditions for 
intermodal competition. In 2004 the access fee system was changed in several important 
ways. First, the access fees per unit of traffic were set two years in advance instead of 
essentially being negotiated after the fact. Second, the structure of the fees was changed 
to sharply increase fees for local passenger trains, freight, and ancillary services (such 
as stops in stations or the use of marshalling yards). Third, the projected total volume of 
fees was forecast to increase more gradually at a rate of about 300 million euros per 
year. 
Similarly, in Germany, the federal government owns the track infrastructure and is 
responsible for its preservation and for securing a certain level of public transport 
service by means of the Deutsche Bahn (DB), an independent joint-stock holding whose 
sole shareholder is the state. The infrastructure division of DB bears operating and 
maintenance costs and is in charge of stations, ticket sales, passenger attention, etc. It is 
also responsible for setting charges for track usage, which are supposed to cover all 
infrastructure costs, including investment. These charges are based on prices per 
train/km on the different line sectors, resulting in a number of different fee 
combinations (Häfner, 1996). 
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In Spain, the 2003 Railroad Law introduced charges for the usage of rail 
infrastructure, stations and other track elements that conform to EC Directive 2001/14. 
These charges intend to recover infrastructure’s full costs, and include four components: 
access, capacity reservation, circulation and traffic. The access charge is a general 
payment to be made by all licensed operators for the right to use the infrastructure. The 
capacity reservation and circulation fees depend on the kilometres of track used and 
vary with the type of service or train, the hour of the day and the characteristics of the 
track. Finally, the traffic charge is levied on the operators depending on the economic 
value of their service as measured by the number of seat-kilometres or ton-kilometres 
operated. 
 
 
4. Quality and safety regulation in the rail industry 
 
Quality performance is not neutral for the economic contribution of the rail transport 
sector to the social welfare. The particular level of quality achieved by train operators 
and particular features in regard to three main dimensions that broadly define quality in 
the rail industry (service, externalities and investment) critically determine the value 
added by this transport mode. The first question that naturally arises is why quality 
regulation is needed at all in this industry, and to what extent this regulation relates to 
the standard price regulation mechanisms described in the previous section. Economic 
theory provides a well-known argument to answer these questions: real world transport 
activities are characterized by market failures due to information problems. 
In an ideal world with a large number of competitive rail transport service providers 
and well-informed consumers of passenger and freight services, quality regulation 
would not be required since market forces would adjust consumer demand (in terms of 
prices, levels of output and of quality of service) to firm supply. If no price correction 
took place, less reliable rail companies would be driven out the market and only those 
whose price-quality ratios were in accordance with demand would remain. However, 
when full information doesn’t exist, markets cannot exert this disciplinary role on firms 
and purely competitive solutions do not always positively affect quality, prices, or 
output. Pure competition may result in unsafe, unreliable or unpleasant services since 
limited availability of resources and lack of adequate control mechanisms make it 
impossible to adjust consumer and producer interests. 
In the traditional organization of the rail industry some years ago, a monopolistic 
structure with a single firm providing services at the national or local level, price-quality 
adjustment problems may have increased since the monopoly’s privately optimal level 
of quality may not have coincided with social standards. Simple price regulation is 
seldom a solution. Any regulated, multi-product monopolist in an environment of 
asymmetric information tends to degrade quality in order to achieve higher profits once 
it enters the market. Railway firms are not immune to this temptation, for example, in 
terms of punctuality and cancellation standards. The quality outcome of any monopolist, 
not just in the rail sector, heavily depends on the specific regulation adopted. For 
example, with rate of return regulation, over-investing in non-required technological 
quality may accentuate the Averch-Johnson effect. Alternatively, with price cap 
regulation, a subtle cut in quality can be a very tempting way to cut costs (Carbajo, 
Estache and Kennedy, 1997). 
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Therefore, the price regulation mechanisms analyzed above are considered incomplete 
if they do not include quality provisions. This is not always easy, since adjusting price 
mechanisms by quality may render them inoperative or excessively difficult for the firm 
to manage or the regulator to monitor. Therefore, most regulators set quality standards 
or targets for train operators instead of correcting price control mechanisms. 
 
 
4.1. Definition of quality targets 
 
In setting up those quality standards incorporated in concession contract designs, the 
regulator often uses the principles of yardstick competition.5 These quality standards 
may be constructed at the national or regional level with inter-industry comparisons (as 
in Brazil and Chile for many of their public utilities) or by establishing international 
benchmarks or best practices (as in Australia for transport services and infrastructures).  
Three elements are considered in detail when designing this process. First, as in other 
transport modes, quality is mainly measured in service levels or specified service 
standards. However, this measurement is suited more for factors such as train 
punctuality, the reliability of services and the waiting time at stations or platforms, than 
it is for other factors.6 Simultaneously, the services provided before the transport itself, 
such as ticketing, reservations, and luggage or cargo handling are often ignored as part 
of the rail industry’s value chain, although they may constitute relevant aspects of both 
intramodal and intermodal competition. For these reasons, the first element to consider 
in designing a quality control in the rail industry is an integrated vision of transport 
service that includes not only the ride itself, but all aspects related to infrastructure 
(track and stations), stations and pre- and post-transport services provided to clients. 
A second aspect of quality regulation that is particularly relevant to railways is the 
flexibility with which scheduled services can be changed and new services introduced in 
response to changes in demand. Here, the rail industry has always been at a 
disadvantage to road transport because of the need to coordinate working timetables and 
operations with certain technical requirements due to the lack of alternative routes 
between points.  
Hence, it is not usually easy (with a few increasing exceptions in many countries) for 
rail transport to offer on-demand services to passengers (for example, as done by charter 
airlines) or freight customers (door-to-door services). Thus, coordination is relevant for 
quality of service regulation within the rail firms, and must also be considered in the 
design of the industry structure. For example, one potential disadvantage of the split 
between infrastructure and operations is that coordination might be even more difficult 
when changes have to be negotiated between different organizations, especially where 
timetable approvals also need to be secured from other train operators using conflicting 
train paths. 
Intermodal coordination with other industries is also necessary, since social quality 
performance is always evaluated in relation to feasible alternatives. Saturated corridors 
                                                 
5 This is done to avoid the problem of regulator’s capture and the discretionary nature of the regulatory 
action. However, there is a risk of making undue comparisons between different rail systems. 
6 For example, railway tracks can deteriorate with respect to the smoothness of the ride or the noise or 
vibration generated to passengers and third parties (buildings close to tracks) even though punctuality 
and/or safety are not jeopardized, so there may be an incentive to reduce maintenance standards in this 
respect. 
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(where investment in roads, railways and airports clearly overcomes demand) are a 
waste of resources that few economies can assume. This almost general equilibrium 
approach constitutes the third element of the quality regulation process, although it is 
not particular to this industry. The socio-political implications of quality regulation (in 
terms of equity or public service obligations and the social acceptance of quality 
standards) determine the overall targets to be established in each industry. 
 
Table 1: Quality dimensions of the rail industry. 
Dimension Definition Measurement Variables 
V
eh
ic
le
 
Onboard quality 
(wagons, locomotives) 
- Age of vehicle/number of years in service 
- Vehicle size and load factor 
- Availability of seats 
- Accessibility 
- Travel comfort 
     -  noise                - vibration 
     -  temperature     -  tidiness 
R
ou
te
 Route quality  
(travel of passengers  
and cargo) 
- Distribution and number of stations 
- Timetable: 
     - peak trains       - first-last train 
     - weekend-commuter services 
- Frequency (number of trains per hour) 
- Punctuality/reliability (waiting at stations) 
- Cargo services (reliability) 
Quality 
of 
Service 
 
Se
rv
ic
e Pre-transport and post-transport service 
quality 
(added value to service) 
- Ticket sales/reservations 
- Handling 
- Staff adequacy and competence 
- Inquiries and general information 
- Response to complaints 
External 
Quality 
Externalities 
(safety and environment) 
- Public service obligations 
- Safety procedures 
- Liability regimes 
- Environment protection (noise, pollution)       
- Congestion 
 
Taking into account these three characteristics, Table 1 summarizes the five most 
important quality dimensions for the railway industry (vehicle, route, service, social and 
dynamic quality) along with a number of standard performance measurement 
instruments for them. The first three (vehicle, route and service) are related to what is 
usually named (internal) quality of service, whereas the last one refers to externalities. 
 
 
4.1.1. Quality of service 
 
Regulation of the quality of rail transport services in regarding vehicle quality, the 
transport service itself (aboard trains) and the pre- and post-transport services has been 
dealt with in different depths in different countries although there is a positive 
correlation between the extent of the restructuring activity in the rail industry (in terms 
of private participation and/or separation of infrastructure from services) and the quality 
regulation requirement imposed on the industry post-restructuring. 
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In general, countries where the sector is still heavily dependent on government or 
public agencies (such as in Eastern Europe and Asia) have done less to establish 
separate quality control frameworks than in those where private participation has been 
significant (for example, the United Kingdom) and detailed quality control systems have 
been set up. In all cases, the basic principle governing the design of quality mechanisms 
is that customer service should be paramount if railways are to maximize profitability 
and compete with alternative modes of transport. The economic relationship between 
separate units in a railway enterprise should be structured to ensure the preservation of 
incentives to maximize customer service (see Swift, 1997a, 1997b).  
This is particularly relevant to the separation of infrastructure and operations. Vertical 
unbundling in railways distances infrastructure management from the end-user customer 
and could yield undesirable side effects or contradictions. For example, the density of 
traffic (trains per day) that maximizes returns on infrastructure investment is likely to be 
greater than the optimal level from the operators’ point of view. This is because at high 
densities, passenger service is likely to suffer due to congestion. Therefore, no matter 
whether the separation is institutional or only financial, mechanisms to compensate 
infrastructure units that run below optimal capacity must be incorporated into contracts 
in order to maximize end-user customer performance as a whole. Since the particular 
characteristics of the rail industry in each country require fine tuning of any regulatory 
or contract enforcement mechanism, Table 2 proposes a simple scheme that identifies 
and separates the roles to be assigned to the regulator and the operator (either 
franchisees or public or private monopolies) with regard to quality of service regulation. 
 
Table 2: Role assignment in railways quality of service regulation. 
Role Regulator Operator Both 
Design of adequate quality of service standards ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Level of application of these standards  ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Punishments, fines, sanctions, etc. ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Information to passengers about quality standards ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Variables to be controlled ✔ ✕ ✕ 
Inspection and reporting procedures ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Responsibility for achieving quality standards ✕ ✔ ✕ 
Risk sharing of service quality fluctuations ✕ ✔ ✔ 
Technical quality ✔ ✕ ✔ 
 
After its reform and the full privatization of services and track provision, the United 
Kingdom’s rail system constitutes one of the most practical examples of a detailed 
quality of service regulatory framework (see Table 2). For example, in the case of 
passenger transport, the regulatory agency (Office for Passenger Rail Franchising, 
OPRAF) defined what level of service is tendered for particular routes and corridors and 
sets the minimum level of service for every route in the country (not only timetable 
specifications, but also journey time, first and last departure times, etc.) If franchises 
operated a poorer service than specified then the OPRAF had the right to withhold the 
license. 
Operators awarded with licenses, Train Operating Companies (TOCs), are obliged to 
include in their timetable certain passenger service requirements set out in the franchise 
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agreement. These are the minimum standards of quality that operators need to achieve 
to ensure the basic provision of services. However, in order to avoid excessively 
limiting the freedom of the operators, these requirements do not specify detailed 
timetables for each route, but instead set parameters within which each company must 
design its own timetable. Passenger service requirements are set out by route and are 
largely based on the former British Rail timetable, specifying frequency of trains, 
stations to be served, maximum journey times, first and last trains, weekend services, 
through services, and load factors/peak train capacity (for commuter services). 
Passenger service requirements also include limits on the number of train cancellations 
and, where applicable, the level of capacity that needs to be provided. These limits 
apply in any 28-day reporting period, with three levels determined: (i) a call-in level, 
where OPRAF reviews the performance of the operator; (ii) a second level, where the 
operator is in breach of the franchise agreement, and (iii) a third level, which can trigger 
default of the agreement.  
For example, load factor requirement compliance is measured by the ratio of 
passengers exceeding capacity to the total number of passengers (PIXC). The maximum 
acceptable PIXC level is 3% for morning and evening peak together, or 4.5% for either 
peak considered alone. If extra capacity is needed to meet load factor specifications, the 
cost is shared by the operator and OPRAF according to the following criteria: (i) up to a 
certain capacity limit, the franchise payment does not change; (ii) between the initial 
limit and a second limit, OPRAF bears a share of costs, and (iii) above the second limit, 
all costs are paid by OPRAF. 
In practice, not all of the quality dimensions defined in Table 1 can be incorporated in 
the same proportion to any service quality mechanism. The British system mainly 
focuses on the route dimension and is based on their extensive experience with 
deregulation. When the role assignment proposed in Table 2 is not considered, or its 
components cannot be easily separated, several quality regulation failures may arise. 
The most important is the failure to define adequate independent quality measures. This 
is the case of several rail concessionaires in Argentina, where the level of vertical 
integration between the train service providers and the maintenance firms (in the form 
of subsidiaries or units integrating a larger industrial group) has distorted the incentive 
to provide the optimal price-quality ratio in favour of more frequent repairs and 
technical updates.  
 
 
4.1.2. Safety and externalities 
 
Regulation of the quality of service is only one of the two static aspects of quality 
regulation to be considered in designing a global framework for quality regulation in the 
rail industry. The social or external dimension of quality regulation, including all issues 
related to safety and externalities (pollution, congestion, etc.) must also be considered, 
and it specifically differs from level of service quality regulation in at least four aspects.  
The first element is the scope of regulation. Since non-compliance with social quality 
standards may affect users and non-users of transport services, these standards should 
always be exogenously set, by national or supranational legislation with intermodal 
implications, in the case of the rail industry. This is not always the case for timetables, 
load factors or vehicle size, variables that usually have simple intra-firm consequences. 
In the European railway industry, for example, three levels of quality regulation can be 
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found. Directive 91/440 determined the overall principles, and the obligation to comply 
was envisaged in mode-specific regulation (e.g. Railways Act in the United Kingdom) 
or in legislation that applies to all sectors of the economy (e.g. Health and Safety Act). 
The second factor that makes service quality regulation different from social quality 
regulation in the rail industry is that a regulatory approach must be used in the latter. 
Since the risks associated with accidents or potential environmental damages not only 
directly affect the private benefit, but also the social benefit of this transport mode, there 
is a need for an external regulator or agency to coordinate safety and reliability. This 
coordination is particularly important when firms move from a public to a deregulated 
system. Furthermore, in the rail industry, separation of infrastructure from services and 
the introduction of open access have made it necessary for a rail track controller to 
ensure safe coordination between different operators who are using the same tracks or 
stations.  
Again using the British railway system as an example, their safety regulator is the 
Health Safety Executive (HSE), which informs and advises the Office of the Rail 
Regulator (ORR). Operators of railway services, stations and networks must have an 
accepted safety case before the ORR approves their license. A safety case is a complete 
resource, control and management plan for delivering safety and defining safety 
procedures, organizations and systems. The private infrastructure provider, Railtrack, is 
required to have its own safety case, a fundamental component of which is Railtrack’s 
Safety Management System, which is a system of operational and technical standards to 
ensure safety and safe interworking in Railtrack’s infrastructure. 
The third aspect of particular interest to safety regulation in the railway industry is the 
assessment and assignment of risk. Given the inherent difficulties associated with strict 
monitoring, incentives exist for quality-regulated private providers of rail transport 
services to place compliance with safety requirements below the attainment of financial 
objectives. 
In fact, despite recent tragedies, railways traditionally have a good reputation for 
safety, a perception that converges with statistical proof in most countries. Therefore, 
one could conclude that safety levels and management are quite sufficient and no 
particular safety precautions or measures should be taken. However, public outcry, 
negative social effects and adverse public opinion from a single catastrophe, together 
with the persistence of regular fatalities (staff accidents, passengers joining and 
alighting trains, etc.) make it impossible for the regulator to avoid designing measures 
and policies to diminish individual and social risk.  
One of these policies relates to the compulsory insurance against third-party liability, 
since it may correct the operators’ incentives to take excessive risk. In Europe, for 
example, Directive 95/18 required that operators of train services must obtain, together 
with the operating license and path allocations, a safety certificate and insurance. The 
insurance arrangements in the privatized British railway industry provide another 
example of scope of liability cover: the basis and conditions for self-insurance. In this 
case, licenses for the private operators of railway assets (passenger trains, freight trains, 
stations, and maintenance depots) contain a condition requiring the operator to maintain 
insurance against third-party liability for licensed activities. The type, cover, level and 
identity of the insurer need the approval of the regulator, who sets guidelines on 
minimum insurance requirements that operators must meet. The operation of licensed 
activities without insurance approved by the regulator is considered a breach of the 
license. 
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Finally, the fourth element where service quality regulation differs from social quality 
regulation is externality issues and, in particular, those connected with the environment 
(engine pollution, noise, transport of hazardous goods, etc.) Again, in this case, social 
quality regulation should be concerned with rail operators’ internal and external factors, 
and should have several differences and similarities to other transport modes. 
For example, air pollution is one of the most regulated areas in the road and air 
transport modes, but is not a critical issue in the rail industry though, there are some 
notable exceptions in certain countries and routes. Noise pollution in suburban 
neighbourhoods, areas close to stations and depots and delicate countryside ecosystems 
has attracted more attention from both the public and regulators. Most countries, 
therefore, incorporate into their regulation the design and specification of measures to 
reduce noise produced by rolling stock and stationary sources (fans, compressors, and 
generators) and shunting noise. 
The final issues related to environmental regulation are measuring, analyzing and 
predicting the emissions of chemical substances (heavy metals, lubricants, dust, etc.) 
where railway lines are present and assessing the risk to the safety of local residents as a 
result of rail-related activities (transport of dangerous goods, explosions, etc.) In these 
cases, most countries subordinate their social quality standards and the role of their 
regulators to the overall technical principles emanating from supranational organisms or 
professional associations. Private and public rail transport operators are obliged to 
comply with national and supranational environmental standards. In Europe, for 
example, there are EC Directives on air pollution from vehicles that specify 
environmental standards for vehicle engines and fuel qualities which apply to both 
vehicles (wagons, locomotives) and transport operations. 
 
 
4.2. Instruments for quality control 
 
Once the objectives for service and social quality are well established, the next step in 
devising a quality regulation system for railways is designing control instruments. In 
principle, there are three alternative mechanisms for regulating quality in the rail 
industry.  
First, the firm can simply be required to publish and report measures of quality every 
pre-defined period. This information can also be made public to inform consumers 
and/or actual or potential rivals about the operator’s current performance. As in any 
other type of regulatory process, access to public information is a very delicate issue 
since it can serve as a disciplinary device for the rail provider and as a strategic 
instrument to undermine or strengthen the ability of the firm to survive in the market. 
A second quality control mechanism is including a direct, explicit measure of quality 
in the price control mechanism. For example, when subject to rate of return regulation, a 
rail service provider may be obliged to calculate its asset base according to certain 
average values and/or obtain authorization to carry out certain technological 
improvements in order to avoid overinvestment and make use of the Averch-Johnson 
effect. Similarly, under price cap restrictions, the basket of products whose average 
price increase is controlled by the regulator can be defined to avoid changes in quality 
(and consequently, cost reductions) that could be used by the regulated firm to increase 
profit, even if the same price caps are maintained. 
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The third mechanism that can be used to control quality is a customer compensation 
scheme, where grants or payments are awarded to people affected by non-compliance 
with quality standards. In practice, these mechanisms only work if quality failures can 
be easily verified. This requires a detailed regulation not only of quality standards, but 
also of monitoring rules and guarantees for both the regulator and the regulated that the 
inspection process will be transparent and objective. Moreover, if the compensation is 
distributed to consumers, either directly by the firm or through an intermediary body, 
sharing rules must be also defined. The practical difficulties associated with this quality 
control mechanism have made it common in many countries to instead specify 
minimum quality standards for certain parameters of the rail industry, backed by 
explicit legal sanctions that may include fines or the revocation or withdrawal of the 
operating license. 
 
Table 3: Instruments for quality control in the privatized rail industry. 
Regulation stage Instrument Additional characteristics 
- Pre-tender qualification  
Requirements 
- Experience  
- Financial strength 
- Technical ability 
- Specification of service  
characteristics in licenses 
- Routes and frequencies 
- Timetables 
- Vehicle capacities and load factor 
- Punctuality and reliability 
 
 
 
Stage I: 
Before entering  
The market 
- Specification of financing rules  
and investment plans 
- Investment plans 
- Fleet and track renewal rates 
- Quality of price-control  
Mechanisms 
- Rate of return regulation vs. Price cap  
Regulation 
- Information revelation obligation - Control of access to critical information 
- Audit processes - Internal and/or external 
- Company reporting - Frequency 
- Format 
- Regulator’s direct monitoring - Setup of monitoring mechanisms and rules 
 
 
Stage II: 
During market  
Operation 
- Technological control - Tacograph readings, electronic controls. 
- Incentive payments - Customer compensation schemes 
- Penalties - Fines for underperformance 
Stage III: 
After market  
Operation 
- Enforcement and binding rules - Contract withdrawal as a last resource 
 
Finding the adequate mix of these control mechanisms is often the most difficult task 
in the design of the quality regulation process. The approach followed by most countries 
is outlined in Table 3, with a summary of the most important instruments. Thus, the 
quality regulation process consists of three stages. First, before entering the market 
(Stage I), the goal is to anticipate and minimize future conflicts between the regulator 
and the concessionaire.7 Licenses must specify the expected characteristics of the 
service in terms of, for example, routes and frequencies of trains or timetables. For 
passenger services, particularly in the case of urban and suburban trains, vehicle 
                                                 
7 To achieve this, pre-tender qualification requirements can be used in order to ensure a minimum level of 
technical and practical expertise and financial solvency, as described in the previous section. 
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capacities and punctuality can also be set. Finally, in order to not forget the dynamic 
dimension of quality described above, Stage I must also specify investment plans and 
financing rules. Afterwards, during market operation (Stage II), instruments for quality 
control in the rail industry should mostly be related to the direct monitoring of the 
firm’s performance. Thus, this is the time to introduce quality incentives in price-
mechanisms, to establish the firm’s obligation to reveal information and the auditing 
(external or internal) processes to be carried out. In most cases, the use of technical 
control instruments (such as tacographs or track electronic controls) complements the 
standard instruments. Finally, after the transport activity has already occurred (Stage 
III), compensations or punishments can be implemented according to any of the 
schemes described above. Both penalties and incentives must be graded according to the 
expected future evolution of the relationship, since severe fines or large subsidies may 
alter the behaviour of the operator in the market. 
 
 
5. Performance indicators 
 
Performance indicators are used in the rail industry to monitor the behaviour of one or 
more regulated firms in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory measures to 
which they are subjected.8 The main advantage of these indicators or indices is that they 
provide a periodical assessment and control of the firm’s activity and continuously 
update information, simply, quickly, and at a relatively low administrative cost for the 
regulator.  
The most important disadvantage of performance indicators is that their use is only 
valid when comparisons (whether between different firms or the same firm over time) 
are constructed on a similar basis. For inter-firm comparisons, the companies must 
belong to countries with similar characteristics (e.g. the participation of transport in the 
economy as a whole, the degree of economic development, or the regulatory 
framework, etc.). For intra-firm comparisons, indicators must account for external and 
internal changes produced during each period (e.g. new management, changes in 
demand, etc.) 
Comparisons across companies usually provide interesting, persuasive results that can 
help the regulator set objectives and design future license contracts. However, extreme 
care should be used in drawing normative conclusions from these results. What 
constitutes a benchmark of desirable practice for some objectives may differ among 
companies. For example, countries with very liberalized frameworks in their rail 
industry (the United States, for example) could set desirable productivity indicator 
levels (or quality of service) that clearly differ from the levels in other more regulated 
frameworks (such as in Europe). 
Similarly, simple indicators should be carefully interpreted over time to avoid 
contradictions and inappropriate measurements. For example, when assessing railway 
output, the number of trains/km may be relatively high, while passengers/km or tons/km 
may be relatively low (if the firm specializes in one type of traffic). Given this conflict, 
overall performance can be ambiguous. The most practical solution is to jointly interpret 
                                                 
8 For example, quality indicators can be established in a contract and reviewed regularly to confirm that 
the terms of the license are being fulfilled. 
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the indicators and the objectives that they serve. For example, a service quality 
objective, such as the number of trains per hour, may conflict with both financial 
objectives, reflected in a high cost recovery rate, and objectives based on the 
maintenance of low prices. 
Thompson and Fraser (1996) point out that monetary and productivity variables 
should be carefully defined for inter-firm comparisons. Fares, wages, outputs and inputs 
vary widely among countries for a large number of reasons that are not necessarily 
related to the firm’s operations, but to measurement or statistical errors. For example, 
average passenger fares are based on the overall mix of passenger classes (each with a 
different price). Tariffs are often higher per passenger/km for short trips than for long 
ones, and they must also depend on the existence of government subsidies or artificial 
compensations. Similarly, common freight tariff mistakes include not accounting for the 
different mix of commodities, size of shipment or length of haul. The latter also affects 
passenger traffic and is particularly relevant since some costs (ticketing, billing and 
station maintenance, for example) are fixed with respect to the length of the trip but 
vary with size or distance. 
These difficulties are increased when measuring productivity, since a simple 
comparison among partial measurements of output cannot capture the complexity of 
relationships or the variety of productive structures that take place within a rail operator. 
For example, a commonly used productivity indicator, the number of passengers/km or 
tons/km per employee,9 depends on such diverse factors (e.g., regulatory environment, 
structure of the labour market, availability and quality of infrastructure, alternative 
transport modes, etc.), that it could be seriously misleading if interpreted without care. 
To elude these sorts of problems, the construction of performance indicators should 
avoid excessively simple data management, and use statistical techniques that account 
for the different relative environments of each company. Oum and Yu (1994), for 
example, estimated different efficiency levels for a sample of OECD railway companies 
by introducing internal factors (such as the characteristics of outputs) and external 
factors (difference in the legal and regulatory framework between companies).  
Despite these difficulties, a large number of indicators are commonly used to monitor 
the performance of firms within the rail industry around the world. The definition of 
each particular indicator depends on its objectives and its informative value.  
Several external factors that vary widely from country to country and firm to firm 
substantially influence comparisons. Therefore contextual indicators assist in 
comparative analysis and define desirable performance levels. They include social and 
economic characteristics of the railways as well as other elements associated with the 
economy as a whole. Directed mainly at the regulator, they control for the exogenous 
factors in inter-firm and intra-firm comparisons. Table 4 presents several examples from 
international statistical sources.10 Simultaneously, there are many indicators 
(particularly those for prices and quality of service) that are informative to transport 
users and provide input for the regulator's control tasks. Jointly with the contextual 
indicators, these management indicators provide the necessary instruments to judge the 
management and behaviour of the company, and can be grouped at three different 
levels, summarized in Table 5. 
                                                 
9 The term employee can also refer to terminal staff, administrative staff, train crew or maintenance staff. 
Similarly, capital can be disaggregated into trains, wagons, terminals, platforms, routes, etc. 
10 In particular, the International Union of Railways (UIC) publishes a yearly summary of the main 
statistics of its affiliated railways, although not all of them are always available for all railroads. 
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Table 4: Contextual indicators in the rail industry. 
Type Examples 
 
 
Overall economic activity 
GDP 
GDP per capita 
Urbanization degree 
Industry structure 
Energy costs 
Private cost of capital 
Transportation sector importance 
Participation of transport in GDP 
Intermodal market share (passengers and freight) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall rail sector indicators 
• Output 
Passenger trains/km  
Freight trains/km 
Passengers/km 
Tons/km 
• Revenues  
Passenger revenue 
Freight revenue 
• Network indicators 
Length of line 
Length of track 
Electrified track (%) 
Route/km/km2  
• Density and service 
Train routes/km per capita 
Trains/km per routes/km 
Average size of shipment 
Average length of haul 
• Organization of the industry 
Regulatory agencies (number) 
Separation of infrastructure and services (type) 
Access and entry system (type) 
Regulatory and institutional system 
State involvement in economy (in % of GDP) 
Tax and Judiciary system (corruption index) 
 
Some final practical rules that could be helpful in this process are as follows: (i) each 
indicator should have at least a function or objective, (ii) the relationship between each 
indicator and its objective must be clear and direct, although (iii) multiple objectives can 
be addressed by multiple indicators (jointly interpreted); and finally, in order to assure 
the utility of the indicators, (iv) appropriate data must be provided and (v) the 
management of the indicators’ information should be part of the regulatory process. 
For the regulator, price indicators can be a control mechanism over the activities of 
the operators, despite the difficulties mentioned. This control may be established not 
only in terms of the comparison between companies with similar characteristics, but 
through monitoring over a period of time. In any event, the regulator must ensure that 
any variation in price corresponds to a proportionate variation in costs or level of 
efficiency. The operational and efficiency indices therefore are instruments that help the 
regulator. Improvements in company productivity and efficiency levels combined with 
increases in price levels are clear signs of abuse of market power on the part of railway 
operators. 
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Table 5: Management indicators in the rail industry. 
Type Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commercial 
• Prices 
Average passenger fare (revenues per passenger/km) 
Average freight price (revenues per ton/km) 
• Quality of service 
Average train-speed (in passengers and freight) 
Delayed arrivals or departures (as % of scheduled) 
% of lost or damaged freight 
Average passenger load factor 
Traffic density (trains per hour) 
• Pollution and safety 
Rate of fuel usage (per train/km) 
Level of noise 
Level of emission of pollutants 
Number of accidents or incidents 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational 
• Labour productivity 
Passengers/km per employee 
Tons/km per employee 
Passenger trains/km per employee 
Freight trains/km per employee 
Total trains/km per employee 
• Capital productivity 
Number and kms. travelled by locomotives  
Locomotive availability (in %)  
Tons/km per wagon/km 
Wagons/km per wagon 
Tons/km per wagon 
 
 
 
Financial 
• Efficiency 
Costs per employee. 
Costs per unit of capital 
Unit cost (per passenger/km, ton/km, train/km) 
• Profits 
Revenues/costs 
Subsidies 
 
Indicators of service quality that were earlier presented should serve the same way as 
price indices to establish evaluations of different companies, as well as dynamic or time 
evaluations. These measurements should be analyzed together with price indices 
because of the possibility of finding different feasible combinations of price and service 
quality. For example, a high number of trains per hour, i.e. a high traffic density, could 
only be financed by means of high prices. 
The simultaneous implementation of control systems for prices and service quality 
may limit the firm management and reduce operability. Placing an emphasis on price 
control or service quality depends on whether it prefers to offer services at the lowest 
possible price, or offer services with certain standards of quality. All of these indicators 
allow the regulator to monitor the operators’ activities as defined in Phase II of Table 3. 
Unjustified or systematic breaches of quality standards (insufficient number of trains 
per hour, lack of punctuality, unreliability, very high indices of load factor, etc) should 
be accompanied by an appropriate system of penalties, as described above. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has reviewed the theoretical foundations to regulate prices and quality 
service levels in the rail sector. Also the paper describes how the current changes in this 
industry have provoked the necessity to modify the old mechanisms to control prices 
and quality decisions. The institutional separation between infrastructure and 
operations, the horizontal unbundling process and the increasing contribution of private 
participation have promoted the introduction of novel and new regulatory systems. But 
the definition and the application of these systems present problems and difficulties 
which must be appropriately evaluated. The elaboration of a suitable list of measures or 
indexes which allow to monitor the performance of the industry is crucial in order to 
reduce these problems.  
 
In conclusion, there is no unique form of rail regulation to address these new 
challenges, but the general rule is to maintain flexibility and simplicity whenever 
possible. Two key issues in the new regulatory environment of the rail industry are that 
private participation is included in license contracts and the organization of the industry 
is adapted to each country’s needs and characteristics. In turn, using these mechanisms 
also changes the role of the rail regulator, whose actions should now be governed by 
principles that foster competition and market mechanisms and simultaneously provide a 
stable legal and institutional framework for economic activity. The regulator should 
refrain from intervention unless the ultimate goal of achieving economic efficiency 
subject to the socially demanded level of equity is in jeopardy. 
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Abstract 
 
This article presents a detailed historical overview of the existence of the largest railway in the world, 
which runs for 5,867 miles and connects Far East with Western Europe. Over the years it gained many 
names, such as Trans Siberian Land Bridge, Trans Siberian Route, Trans Siberian Line and Trans 
Siberian Railway but each one of the names stand for the longest rail route across the continent of 
Eurasia. This article provides an opportunity to look at early stages of railway’s construction, its 
uniqueness, interesting path of development, survival of two World Wars and finally its establishment as 
a vital part of continent’s logistics chain. Throughout the years, the Trans Siberian Railway (TSR) has 
been proven to have the longest history of commercial freight operation between Europe and the Far East. 
 
Keywords: Trans Siberian Railway; Logistics. 
 
 
 
Construction of the Trans Siberian Railway 
 
The initial idea of a railway construction, which would open up Siberian region for 
development, was set out by general governor of Eastern Siberia N.N Muravyov-
Amurskly in 1857. In the following years, this idea inspired military engineer D. 
Romanof to create a project, which involved building a railway line that would 
ultimately connect Russia to Siberia. The idea was highly thought of however the cost 
of such a construction ensured no support from the Russian government. This was 
mainly due to the lack of funds and the insufficient number of railways which connected 
Russia to its mining interests (Soviet Geography, 1990). Only in 1873 when the Ural 
Railway Company was established to link iron and coal rich Ural mines with central 
Russia, the Russian government started working in earnest for the Trans-Siberian 
Railway. There were many suggestions from foreign entrepreneurs to fund the 
construction, but nonetheless the Russian government decided to use its own funds, 
because capitalists could have strengthened foreign influence on Siberia and the Far 
East of Russia whilst building the railway there and it was unacceptable at the time 
(Slepven, 1996). 
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Figure 1: historical map of the Trans Siberian Railway. 
Source: http://www.transsib.ru/Map/transsib-building.gif. 
The first real impulse to start construction works on the new Trans Siberian Railway 
line was given by Tsar Alexander III in 1886 but in reality it did not come into effect 
until 1891 when the construction actually began from both ends, Vladivostok (East 
Siberia) and Chelyabinsk (West Siberia), and worked towards the centre (see figure 1).  
 
 
 
The project was built in several sections. From 1891 until 1897 a railway line 
connecting Vladivostok and Khaberovsk was completed because by 1880 Vladivostok 
had grown into a major port city, and the lack of adequate transportation links between 
European Russia and its Far Eastern provinces became an obvious problem. 
A treaty with China in 1896 enabled the Russians to construct an 800 mile railway 
line through Manchuria, this way shortening the distance to Vladivostok. Therefore 
between 1897 and 1903 Russian Government constructed the Chinese Eastern Railway, 
across Manchuria, in Northern China (Soviet Geography, 1990), which connected 
Vladivostok with sections of the TSR in Western and Central Siberia (see figure 1). By 
1904 the TSR stretched from Vladivostok across China and Siberia to the Ural 
Mountains (Moore, 1980). Construction continued, despite the fact that building the 
railroad was a hugely challenging task for the Russian Government due to the difficult 
terrain and extremes of temperature in Siberia. One of the main obstacles to the 
completion of the Trans Siberian line was the Baikal Lake, but a way around the 
lakeshore was completed in 1905. By 1916 the Amur River line, situated north of the 
Chinese border was finished together with the continuous railway line within Russian 
territory from Moscow across Siberia.  
Tsar Alexander III started the construction of the Trans Siberian Railway with the 
vision of providing a reliable communication and transportation system, linking the 
Russian empire with Siberia and making long scale-immigration possible (Jorre, 1961). 
He knew that Siberia was at the mercy of strong Asiatic powers if there wasn’t a reliable 
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communication and transportation system linking the empire with Siberia. This leads to 
a conclusion that the TSR was initially built to protect the Siberian borders and hence 
“the replacement of the normal 4ft gauge by the unusual 5ft gauge was adopted, whose 
adoption aimed at isolating conservative Russia from progressive Europe as well as at 
hindering possible invasions” (Jorre, 1961, p189).  
America was one of the first countries to express their enthusiasm for the longest 
railway line in the world and its advantages to be gained from Russia’s opening up of 
Siberia. The Americans believed in no doubt that “the Siberian Railway would 
invigorate the extensive and richly endowed territories, and create favourable conditions 
for American exports” (Slepnev, p37).  
In the years to follow, the contracts for the equipment of the Trans Siberian Railway 
were given to American firms including the supply of rails, locomotives, freight-car 
bodies, air brakes and engines. The Siberian line not only opened a dependable route to 
the Pacific Ocean but was also the key to the miraculous natural wealth (oil and coal) of 
Siberia and the Far East (Karbonski, 1992).  
 
 
TSR during the world wars 
 
From the earliest days of their introduction railways have been regarded as offering 
the most efficient means for meeting the special needs of military transport in time of 
war and it is a fact, that Russia was one of the countries with a long history of wars. 
Therefore, originally, the Trans Siberian Railway was used during the First World War 
by the Allied powers to transport troops and supplies across the vast territory. In 1914 
the war with Germany worn out the Russian Empire and the Trans Siberian Railway had 
almost ceased to function, in a critical period where German submarines had effectively 
precluded shipment of arms to Russia through the Baltic. As a result military supplies 
were purchased from the US and shipped to Vladivostok awaiting movement via TSR. 
The reorganization of the Trans Siberian Railway meant “access to massive stockpiles 
of munitions, food fuel, coal and other war supplies that the Allied shipping had 
stockpiled in the ports of both Archangel and Vladivostok” (Giffin, 1998) for the Allied 
Russian armies in Europe. 
After the government of Tsar Nicolas fell in 1917, the new pro-western Provisional 
Government needed a substantial amount of money to purchase more supplies (Gaddis, 
1990). Later that year they turned to the American Government for help in order to 
maintain functionality of the Trans Siberian Railway (Jacqueline, 1969). Three hundred 
men from American railway companies were selected to form the Russian Railway 
Service Corps (RRSC) (Johnson, 1923). The American team inspected the railway and 
reached the conclusion that “Trans Siberian Railway was the only usable railway into 
Russia from the outside world” (Culloton, 2002). The RRSC established 14 station units 
distributed along the Chinese Eastern Trans Siberian Railroad to Omsk (Graves, 1931). 
Their duty was to inspect the Trans Siberian line and advise the Russian government on 
how to improve the railway and increase its carrying capacity (Johnson, 1923). 
Siberia became a very important strategic area during the First World War and thus in 
May 1918 United States intervened into the Russian war, with the aim to remove the 
Czech Legion from Siberia, salvage a front against the Germans, prevent Germans from 
seizing Allied supplies and keep a watch upon Japanese who were also intervening in 
Siberia (Unterberger-Miller, 1989). The TSR suffered severe damages as a result of the 
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war – over one hundred bridges, numerous depots, water towers, and other railway 
facilities were in need of considerable repairs or even rebuilding (Gaddis, 1990).  
 The poor condition of the railway, tension caused by the Allied Intervention, the civil 
war and the Czech control over a large portion of the railway, led to the Inter-Allied 
Railway Agreement (Kennan, 1967). The US Government developed a plan for the 
creation of a commission that would operate the railway until the Russians were able to 
resume control. Therefore, in 1919 the Inter-Allied Railway Committee (IARC) was 
established. It included representatives from governments of the following countries: 
Russia, United States, Japan, China, Great Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia. Its 
first task was to divide the railway into sections to be guarded by American, Chinese 
and Japanese powers.  
IARC was the policy-making committee, and therefore a number of specialized 
agencies were established in order to utilize its decisions. The most important agency 
was the Technical Board, which was responsible for the technical and economic 
management of the Trans Siberian line. 
Between 1919 and 1922 the Technical Board contributed substantially to the 
improvement in both railway’s physical condition and its efficiency. Under the Board’s 
direction over one hundred bridges were repaired or rebuilt, entrances to major tunnels 
blocked by explosives were cleared, and depots that had been destroyed were replaced 
(Giffin, 1998). Furthermore, locomotives and cars were repaired quickly and the freight 
tonnage was increased through the use of daily reports on train movements and the 
heavier loading of freight cars. 
In 1922 the Allied troops evacuated Siberia and the Inter-Allied Railway Technical 
Board was dissolved. During its existence the Board achieved a number of goals; they 
managed to re-organize, revitalize, and co-ordinate operations of the Trans Siberian 
Railway (Giffin, 1998). 
In the years to follow Soviet Government realized that Trans Siberian Railway 
provided a major logistics and communication line and therefore, since 1936 TSR was 
used for the movement of freight with the ultimate aim of earning hard currency 
(Helmer, 1999). Transit via the Trans Siberian Railway was favoured by customers, if 
compared to the deep sea route, due to the fact that goods of origin in transit through the 
USSR were not charged export and import duties. In addition to that, TSR route was 
also about 4,375 miles shorter than the route by sea via the Suez Canal from Far East to 
Europe (Soviet Shipping Journal, 1982). 
During the Second World War TSR was mainly used for the movement of military 
cargoes delivered from the United States. The end of the war brought two major 
changes in terms of the historical development of the TSR. Firstly, the Trans-
Manchurian line, connecting Vladivostok and Siberia, came under the Chinese control 
and was renamed as Chand-Chu’nn Railway (Mellor, 1975) and secondly, Eastern and 
Central European countries were taken under Soviet control, as agreed by the West at 
the Yalta Conference in 1945 (Karbonski, 1992). 
 
 
TSR under the Soviet Union rule 
 
This section provides short overview of trade principles in the Soviet Union (SU), its 
economic development and the role of the Trans Siberian Railway in that context.  
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Soviet foreign trade was dominated by three principles: (1) the trading partners had to 
be neighbouring communist countries or the developing third world countries to which 
the Soviet Union has given aid involving trade credits, (2) sale of diamonds, gold, furs 
etc., was carried out to acquire foreign exchange and (3) the acquisition of required raw 
materials and essential consumer imports had to be conducted on the most favourable 
terms (Jain, 1993).  
At that time, the emphasis towards industrialisation, favoured the development of rail 
networks at the expense of other modes (Cullinane and Toy, 1998). Rail transport 
flourished in the middle of 1960’s mainly due to the growth in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors and more particularly to its geographical position, serving even the 
vast areas of Siberia (Mathieson, 1975). 
Despite the fact that it contradicted the main trade principles of the Soviet Union, in 
the years to follow trade with West Europe flourished. The introduction of 
containerization in the world market benefited both the shipping and railway sector in 
the Soviet bloc due to the fact that it led to the co-operation and co-ordination of these 
two sectors and provided through combined transport, the fastest and cheapest route 
from Far East to Western Europe and vice versa (Slepven, 1996). More specifically, in 
1967 the progress of containerization and intermodal transport helped the Trans 
Siberian Railway to gain value as the shortest and cheapest alternative route compared 
to the deep-sea route from Europe to the Far East (Soviet Shipping Journal, 1982). 
In the late 1960’s experimental shipments between Japan and Europe using the Trans 
Siberian Railway were conducted (Zheleznodorozhnyy Transport, 1975). In 1971 a 
formal agreement was signed between the Soviet agency, Soyuzvneshtrans, and the 
Japanese and European freight forwarding agents for the operation of the Trans Siberian 
container route and the creation of a modern system of intermodal container shipping 
known as the Trans Siberian Container Service (TSCS) (Miller, 1978). The first 
recipients of licenses to operate on the TSR were Y.S Van Gend and Loos, and C.T.I 
(JEURO)/ M.A.T. Transport.  
According to this agreement the Soviet agency was responsible for most of the 
facilities of the intermodal service. Furthermore, the agreement provided that the 
containerized cargo heading to Western Europe would be moved using Japanese and 
Soviet vessels from Japan to the Russian port of Nakhoda (U.S News and World Report, 
1975). Once the containers reached Nakhoda they would be loaded on flatcars and move 
across TSR to Moscow. From there the containers would be routed to the container 
terminals on the Baltic Sea coast in Tallinn (Estonia) and Riga (Latvia). There the 
containers would be transferred to ships heading to the country of final destination.  
The co-operation and co-ordination among the countries of the self-sufficient 
communistic Soviet Union was vital for the TSR’s success to follow. The block trains 
which were used to carry the containers were built at the ports of Leningrad, Tallinn and 
Vostochny and at the rail station at Brest (Belarus). Moreover, the USSR focused on 
transforming its Baltic ports from naval bases to water gateways for containers in 
transit. The port of Leningrad was the first of the Soviet ports to develop as a container 
port providing all kinds of container facilities including repairs to damaged containers 
and equipment (Queiroz, 2001).  
In addition, Soviet ship owners established four companies to serve the Western 
European market and maintain a network of TSCS liner services. These were: the Baltic 
Shipping Company, the Estonian Shipping Company, the Latvian Shipping Company 
and the Azov Shipping Company. 
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The Baltic Shipping Company was based in Leningrad operating a fleet of container 
vessels and Ro-Ro ships. The Company was providing weekly services to/from Tilbury, 
Hull in the United Kingdom, Antwerp in Belgium, Rotterdam in The Netherlands, 
Hamburg and Bremen in Western Germany (Lukov, 2000). 
Tallinn was the most important transshipment port for the TSCS due to its 
geographical location, close to the Scandinavian countries. The Estonian Shipping 
Company was operating frequent services to ports in Stockholm in Sweden, Oslo and 
Drammen in Norway, and Aarhus and Copenhagen in Denmark (Zurek, 2001). 
The Latvia Shipping Company was based in Riga. The Company was providing 
regular container services to Dublin in Ireland, Ellesmere, Rostok and Le Havre in 
France. 
The Azov Shipping Company was situated in the port of Zhdanov. This Company was 
covering all the Mediterranean countries. The services were operated from/to Valencia, 
Barcelona, Ravenna, Savona, Venice, Rijeka, Piraeus, Istanbul, and Alexandria. All four 
Companies are closely co-operating with the TSCS by proving an extensive sea network 
for containers in transit from Far East to Western Europe and vice versa. 
In the early 1970’s, the joint efforts of the Soviet and foreign parties, involved in the 
improvement of the Trans Siberian Container Service, helped the Trans Siberian 
Railway to win popularity and confidence with Japanese and Western European 
transport communities (Helmer, 1999). By 1979 the Trans Siberian Railway had won 
more than 20% of Japan’s westbound export cargo (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 
1979). Moreover, the improvement in political relations between the USA and Soviet 
Union in 1980 lead shippers to view the Trans Siberian Railway more positively 
(Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1980).   
In July 1971 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which was a 
multilateral economic alliance responsible for promoting the economic development of 
the countries that were under the Soviet rule, adopted a plan for complex Socialist 
economic integration, which led to more joint projects and information exchange 
between members (Jorre, 1961). The plan included the exchange of goods among 
communist countries frequently by bilateral negations. However, as mentioned before, 
trade drifted outside the bloc countries, mainly to the third world countries for imports 
of raw materials against capital goods or towards a varied trade with Western European 
countries (Mellor, 1975).  
The lack of convertible currency in the USSR lead to further expansion of energy 
trade with Western Europe in order to earn hard currency (Jain, 1993). This was easily 
achieved because the price system in the Soviet bloc did not depend on the principles of 
supply and demand, but rather upon a series of state-controlled prices for all 
commodities (Roe, 2001). The transport sector was continually subsidized and that 
meant that certain sub sectors, such as shipping and railways could develop as major 
hard currency earners (Lavigne, 1999). 
Even though this opening to the West, against the policy of self-sufficiency, was 
opposed in the Soviet bloc, it provided the opportunity to develop true commercial skills 
and experience of the free market (Soviet Shipping, 1989). The new order occurring in 
the Soviet bloc required new changes in order to be able to trade and benefit from the 
West. Therefore, the most vital change involved the establishment of a convertible 
currency (Bernard, 1966). That was mainly due to the fact that Eastern European 
countries were constrained by the lack of foreign currency, and that meant that these 
countries had to export first in order to be in a position to import later.  
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The problem of non-convertible currency was partially resolved in 1976 by 
introduction of a commercial rate, which was calculated as the average amount of 
domestic currency needed to earn a unit of foreign currency.  
Further more in 1976 the port of Vostochny was developed into the terminal gate of 
the Trans Siberian Railway with the ultimate aim to accommodate TSCS liner services 
in the Far East (Bergstrant and Doganis, 1987). The Far Eastern Shipping Company 
allocated in the port maintained all the TSCS container services in the Far East, 
including Japan, Hong Kong, Philippines, and Thailand.   
In the late 1970’s the FIATA Congress observed that ‘the organization of shipments 
by the Trans Siberian Containers Service was a major achievement on the part of 
European and Japanese forwarding agents’ (Soviet Shipping Journal, 1982). In 
December 1979 the V/O Soyouztransit association was formed which was the Soviet 
Foreign Trade Self-Supporting Corporation, the sole forwarder of transit shipments via 
the USSR territory (Bergstrant and Doganis, 1987). V/O Soyouztransit offered three 
transit routes by TSCS: TRANSRAIL, TRANSEA and TRANSCONS.   
The TRANSRAIL route was providing transit for cargo moved from the Soviet border 
stations, Luzhaika, Brest, Chop, Ungeny, Djulfa and Kushka to ports in Japan and other 
countries in South – East Asia, and vice versa. V/O Soyouztransit was responsible for 
the receipt of containers from the European rail at the Soviet border stations and their 
movement by rail to destination via the ports of Vostochny and Nakhodka (Soviet 
Shipping Journal, 1982). The transit time of containers was approximately 25-30 days. 
The TRANSEA route was providing arrangements for the transportation of containers 
from European ports to Soviet ports in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea, shipment by rail to 
the ports of Vostochny and Nakhodka and further transhipment to a vessel for delivery 
in its destination. The transit time on this route was between 35 and 40 days. 
Finally, the TRANSCONS route was responsible for the carriage of containers by 
road from the Europe to Vysoko-Litovsk near Brest. Once the containers reached Brest, 
they were transhipped onto rail heading to the ports of Vostochny and Nakhodka. From 
there the containers were delivered in their destination by sea. The transit time was 
approximately 40-45 days.  
In order to provide an efficient service on these routes, V/O Soyouztransit was closely 
co-operating with many Forwarding Agents, shipping carriers in Europe and Japan, the 
Soviet railway, and trucking association Sovtransavto (Bergstrand and Doganis, 1987). 
In the years to follow, the joint efforts of the Soviet and foreign parties involved in the 
improvement of the Trans Siberian Container Service, Trans Siberian Railway had won 
popularity and confidence with Japanese and Western European transport communities 
(Helmer, 1999). Figure 2 indicates the movement of containers via the Trans Siberian 
Railway from 1980 to 1989. 
At this point it should emphasized that the actual figures for the amount of containers 
carried by the Trans-Siberian Container Line (TSCL) were difficult to compile 
accurately due to a number of reasons such as different sources, for their own reasons, 
providing different statistics of the amount of containers that the Trans Siberian 
Container Line handled since its establishment (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1980). In 
addition, the figures were, in some instances, confused by the number of different 
countries that transport their containers via the TSR route, making the comparison of 
origin/destination areas a difficult task (Lloyd’s Maritime Asia, 1990). The main 
reasons behind these problems were the lack of co-operation between the operators 
involved due to competition, the lack of co-ordination among the parties involved in this 
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trade, and lack of organization of the TSCL. Also another reason behind the publication 
of different figures at the time was the strict regulations included in the old Soviet 
economic system. More specifically, the Soviet economic system was based on targets. 
If a company succeeded fulfilling the targets imposed then the company could earn 
more money and more security. However, if a company failed to meet the targets 
opposed by the Soviet Rule, then the consequences were very unpleasant. Hence, all 
companies during Soviet times were publishing results that showed they had met 
targets, even if such results did not reflect the reality.   
 
 
Figure 2: container transit via TSR, 1980-1989. 
Source: http://www.erina.or.jp/Forum/Forum2000/eSession1/eNagasawa.htm and Nikolai Lukov, 
Secretariat of the CCTST 
 
However, experts of the region have managed to compile a set of figures that were 
reliable enough to provide a general picture of the TSR route (presented in Figure 2). 
This was achieved partly through collating a wide range of sources and partly by 
comparing the trade between Europe and Japan carried by TSCL and that carried by the 
Far East Freight Conference (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1980). In terms of figures or 
more specifically in terms of TEU capacity, the numbers of containers transported by 
the TSCL between Europe and the Far East increased from 55,000 TEU in 1978 to over 
100,000 TEU in 1979. However in 1980 the movement of containers from Europe to 
Japan and Korea via the Trans Siberian Container Line suffered a considerable decline 
of 10,000 TEU. 
Nevertheless, as it is indicated in Figure 2, the total movement of containers via the 
Trans Siberian Railway had increased in the 1980’s, reaching 110,683 TEU in 1983. 
The main reason for this sharp increase between 1980 and 1983 is mainly due to the war 
between Iran and Iraq that started in 1980 (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1981a). More 
specifically, the number of containers destined for Iran in 1980, increased by 400% 
when compared with 1979, reaching 24,000 TEU (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1981b). 
This was mainly due to both the effects of the war with Iraq, which resulted in the 
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closure of the Iranian ports, and the shortage of shipping space in most trades heading to 
Europe (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1981b). 
From 1982 onwards the competition between sea and rail operators on the Europe/Far 
East route became increasingly intensive due to the announcement of the Trans Siberian 
Container Line’s intention to reduce tariffs, which was expected to increase the 
container traffic going via railways rather than sea (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1982). 
The main reason behind this policy adopted by the TSCL for the reduction of tariffs had 
two aims: one was to increase volumes and the second one to maximize the hard 
currency earnings in the Soviet Union. 
During the same period the competition between shipping lines on the Far East to 
Europe route was increasing, which resulted in the TSCL causing a major concern 
among shipping lines. Most of them were strongly opposing to the Soviet Union’s 
regulation of competition between the Trans Siberian Railways and maritime routes, as 
well as to the subsidies provided to the TSR (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1981b).  
In the first half of 1983 the trade to Iran increased, and so did the volumes of 
containers from the Far East to Iran via the Trans Siberian Railway. This resulted in 
shipping lines, which operated in the Arabian Gulf, having to introduce better quality 
services to Iran (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1983a). At the same time, Soyuztransit 
(SOTRA), the authority which operates the transit system in the TSR, was facing 
problems due to congestion at the Far East ports of Vostochny and Nakhodka and the 
inland station of Djulfa on the Iranian border. The congestion led to delays, which 
consequently raised a number of questions about the future capacity of the land bridge. 
By the end of 1983, the total volume on the Iran-bound TSR cargo was approximately 
44,600 TEU (Lloyd’s Shipping Economist, 1983b). 
In order to keep an advantage over sea transport, Trans Siberian Railway introduced 
regular express block train services at the beginning of 1985 (Lloyd’s Maritime Asia, 
1990). Each block train had 52-55 wagons, carrying up to 110 TEU and these were 
dispatched to five Soviet border destinations: Leningrad (for UK/Baltic traffic), Chop 
(Czechoslovakia/Hungary), Brest (Poland/Germany), Djulfa (Iran) and Lujaika 
(Finland) within 20-21 days from Japan. This newly established service was co-
coordinated by an expert non-vessel operating common carrier, Jeuro Container 
Transport Inc.  
“In its capacity as general agent for v/o Soyuztransit (SOTRA)-the Soviet body 
responsible for operating the Trans-Siberian Container Service-Jeuro arranges all block 
trains bookings through its Yokohama office placed by fellow members of the Trans 
Siberian Intermodal Operators Association of Japan (TSIOAJ)” (Lloyd’s Maritime Asia, 
1990).  
Moreover, along with the new block train system came further improvements in the 
TSR’s operational system, including the introduction of a computer tracking system to 
monitor the movement of containers along the railway.   
The overall movement of containers via the Trans Siberian Railway remained stable 
between 1980 and 1989 however after 1989 the major political differences between the 
Soviet Union and its East European satellites, led to a great uncertainty over its future. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 negatively influenced the development of 
the Trans Siberian Railway and its co-operation with foreign partners, to a large extent 
because all of the Baltic ports which were purposely developed in Soviet times in order 
to facilitate Soviet trade were located in countries, which chose to leave the Soviet 
Union and become independent (Cargo Systems, 2002).  
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Conclusion 
 
Over the years the TSR served a number of purposes and played a significant role in 
the Russian as well as Soviet economy. A lot of the issues regarding the development of 
this railway line have been discussed within this article, however plenty more remain 
yet to be investigated. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the dramatic political and 
economic developments in the former communist countries were closely followed by 
the rest of the world (Estrin, 1994). In particular the transport sector attracted a lot of 
interest. Western governments, companies and international organizations were eager to 
be kept informed, to understand, to advise, to trade, to invest and to be involved in one 
way or another in this region.  
This renewed interest has focussed perhaps more than anything else on the potential 
that the TSR possesses for transporting containers to Europe from the Far East and to 
provide an alternative service to the ocean route and a source of income for Russia. 
This historical discussion creates the base for a future article in which issues relating 
to the operational future of the TSR, following the collapse of the USSR will be 
analyzed. 
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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to emphasize the role of the developing network of roads and motorways in the 
Polish economy and its impact upon expanding competitive solutions in alliance with the ferry shipping 
industry. The paper begins with an assessment of Poland within its geographical location in Europe and of 
its economic connections with other European nations. The first part of the paper presents the current 
situation of road infrastructure in Poland. The second part presents the proposed transport corridors which 
cross a series of European countries and the plans for development of the sections of these routes located 
in Poland. The next part assesses the advantages for Poland and for ferry shipping in particular. 
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Introduction 
One of the Baltic Sea countries, Poland is located on four European transit routes 
North–South and East–West. Its strategic transit location provides an important 
opportunity for development for Poland as a whole. The ports of the Scandinavian 
countries and Denmark in particular assume the foreground for Polish ports and these 
countries are characterised by a high level of economic development and living standard 
for their inhabitants. Meanwhile the countries lying along the North-South transport 
corridor such as: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Austria (the 
Central European states), and Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia and North Italy (the South–East European states) are the hinterland 
for Polish ports. This basic hinterland should also include Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, 
Russia (Kaliningrad), Belarus and West Ukraine. The hinterland for the port of 
Szczecin-Swinoujscie in north-west Poland is also Germany and includes about 40 
million citizens. The countries belonging to the near hinterland for the Polish based 
ferry shipping industry occupies an area almost 50% bigger than the area of the 
foreground (over 1780 km2) and more than 143 million people live there.  
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Figure 1: location of Gdansk and Gdynia ports in the North–South transport corridor. 
Source: Szwankowski, S. (1996) Adaptation of Gdansk agglomeration ports to the service of fast ferry 
connections, in Roe, M.S. International studies in shipping policy and management. University of 
Plymouth, Plymouth. 
 
From 1st of May 2004, Poland has been a member of the European Union. Thanks to 
the continuous integration of Poland with the other European countries it can now play a 
part in the whole EU area characterised without internal borders where free movement 
of people, goods, services, capital and ideas is encouraged and sustained.  
 
The current situation of road infrastructure in Poland 
 
The present condition of road infrastructure in Poland is one of the greatest barriers to 
the growth of the Polish economy and more specifically it has serious impacts upon 
specific industrial and commercial activities. One such activity vital to the improvement 
of Polish overseas trade is Polish ferry shipping centred on the three main Polish Baltic 
Sea ports of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin-Swinoujscie. The existing highway network 
does little to ensure the provision of a suitable quality of service for both passenger and 
freight carriers. Poland still has less than 300 km of motorways whilst Germany, a 
neighbour and of comparable physical size, has over 11,000 km. In addition, the 
physical and technical condition of most of the other existing roads in Poland is very 
poor and it has been estimated that substantial repairs are needed to 63% of the length of 
all Polish highways to make them reach general European standards (Figure 1).  
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notsatisfactory (5732,7 km)                            
poor (5070,0 km)
 
Figure 2: Estimation of the technical situation of highway pavements in Poland (2005). 
Source: Polish Ministry of Infrastructure. 
 
The improvements needed to the non-motorway highway network includes a range of 
different repair works: reinforcements, smoothness, improvements to non-skid 
properties and ensuring that pavements are watertight.  
In addition to this undesirable situation, both the quantitative and qualitative situations 
that exist in the Polish economy inhibits growth in both passenger travel and freight 
transport, something that is becoming a severe problem following Poland’s entry into 
the European Union in 2004. Poland actually possesses a far too small highway capacity 
with at present only 3% of Polish roads with a breadth of more than eight meters. Such 
parameters are far worse than general European standards or the situation found in most 
EU countries. In addition there are almost no domestic nor international roads in Poland 
that provide standards in operating conditions that meet the demands of TIR 
movements. Within the European Union, the standard axle pressure that roads should 
provide for heavy goods vehicles is 115 kN, whilst Polish roads are constructed in the 
main for axle pressures ranging from 60 to 80 kN. Only a very small proportion of 
Polish roads can accommodate truck axle pressures of 100 kN. 
The demands in terms of the range of road movements continues to grow. The 
estimates for 2005 suggest that about 9000 vehicles drive a day on what Polish 
international motorways there are, about 6500 on other international roads and 3000 on 
domestic roads.1 During the last 10 years these movements have more than doubled. 
This is a result amongst others of the fact that road vehicle transport is now responsible 
for over 80% of freight carried. In addition (and perhaps more significantly) car 
ownership has also increased by about 70% in the same time period so that now every 
third Polish citizen is an owner of a car. 
As a consequence of this situation, Poland is not attractive for freight transit 
movements. The shortage of motorways, the substandard and deteriorating condition of 
                                                 
1 Klimek, H. (1999) Motorways in Poland – opportunities or threats for success for maritime ports, (in) 
Competition of maritime transport. Economy of maritime transport. Scientific exercises of University of 
Gdansk, Gdansk. 
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road surfaces, the shortage of grade separated road junctions, the failure to design roads 
for heavy truck movements, the absence of by-passes around city centres and the small 
number of bridges and viaducts causes foreign exporters to avoid Poland where they can 
and to direct their goods (particularly in Eastern Europe for the Swedish and Norwegian 
markets) to the much better developed network of German motorways with clear 
ramifications for Baltic Sea ferry operators operating out of Poland. This in turn leads to 
a reduction in competitiveness for Polish Baltic ports and also a reduction in 
opportunities for the development of the Polish economy resulting in deficiencies in 
international trade, worker mobility and earning foreign capital. 
 
 
Transport corridors 
 
Poland, thanks to its geographical location and the potential capacity of its domestic 
market, has enormous potential for economic development serving markets to both the 
east and west and also as a transit route for north-south movements between South-East 
Europe (The Balkans, Greece, Turkey), and the Middle East and Scandinavia.  
Taking advantage of the potential that Poland displays depends however, on taking 
the decision to develop the existing system of roads and motorways. This in turn will 
have undoubted benefits for the ferry industry located in Poland in the three major ports 
of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin-Swinoujscie. The key improvements needed for 
highways, particularly for the future development of Polish maritime transport, rests 
with the A1 motorway, representing the Polish stretch of the International North–South 
(TEM) motorway and also the A3 motorway, which will connect the ports of 
Swinoujscie and Szczecin with the southern border of Poland. The A1 motorway is one 
section of the third North–South Transport Corridor passing through the Polish Baltic 
ports of Gdansk and Gdynia, and eventually reaching the countries of the Near East, the 
basin of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.  
The idea of pan-European transport corridors came into being at the 1st EU National 
Transport Conference in Prague in 1991. During that conference, the initial plan for 
European transport networks was agreed. As well as new proposals (such as those 
which incorporated Polish motorways), the plan also included existing agreements 
concerning the rebuilding and modernization of many major roads connecting a 
substantial number of European Union countries and beyond.2 
The concept of building a North–South Trans-European Motorway had already been 
developed many years earlier in 1972 under the pre-transition regime. The motorway 
was to have its origin in Gdansk and would pass in the direction of the Mediterranean 
Sea and farther on via Turkey to the Ports of the Persian Gulf.3 
                                                 
2 Andruszkiewicz, W. (1997) Port in Gdansk and the other Polish maritime ports in multimodal land and 
maritime transport, (in) Gdansk on transport map of Europe. The Scientific Session, 50th Anniversary. 
Polish Economic Company, Gdansk.  
3 Andruszkiweicz, W. (1997) Why building of Transeuropean Motorway North–South (TEM/A-1) has its 
beginning in Rusocino located on the South form Pruszcz Gdanski instead in Port of Gdansk? Spedycja i 
Transport, Nr 3/97, pp. 31 - 34. 
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The European Economic Commission and the United Nations agreed plans for the 
building of three main transport corridors which would run North–South across 
European space. The first of them has its beginnings in the United Kingdom near to 
London, crosses the English Channel, France, Spain, the Mediterranean Sea in the 
region of the Gibraltar Strait and then through North Africa and ultimately in the 
direction of West Africa. The second corridor begins in Denmark, crosses Germany, 
Italy, Sicily and the Mediterranean Sea to North Africa. The third corridor, the most 
important for Poland, begins in Finland, crosses via the Baltic Sea to Gdansk and 
Gdynia and then passes through Poland to the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Austria, the Balkans, Greece, Turkey and on eventually to the Persian Gulf and Middle 
East. This proposed motorway route is one of the longest in the world stretching some 
10,000 km including a number of formal branches. By 2005, some 4,000 km of the 
motorway has been constructed and the next 3,000 km are in the building stage. Another 
3,000 km are currently being designed. The beginning of the motorway in Poland is 
located in the ports of Gdansk and Gdynia and the Polish stretch of this TEM is 
numbered motorway A1. The construction of this motorway would create the shortest 
traffic artery connecting Southern Europe with Sweden and the remainder of 
Scandinavia. In 1997 at the 3rd EU Transport Conference in Helsinki, the concept of 
transport corridors was completed with the introduction of Motorways of the Sea 
representing the sections of proposed trans European motorways that crossed seas 
including the Poland-Scandinavia section of the A1. The total number of corridors was 
increased to 10.  
Unfortunately, the Polish part of the project has not been finished some 30 years after 
the inception of the idea of building motorway A1. One of the main reasons for this has 
been the shortage of financial resources. Since 1993, from the moment when it was 
realised that Poland could not afford free motorways, it was decided, like many other 
West European countries including France and Italy, to construct tolled roads. The new 
programme was agreed in 1994 taking into consideration building of 2,600 km of tolled 
roads during the next 20 years – an average of 160 km of motorways a year. According 
to this new plan there was to be built the four following motorways: 
 
• A1 (597 km) from Gdansk via Lodz, Katowice to Gorycze near to Rybnik; 
• A2 (626 km) Swiecko – Poznan – Warsaw – Terespol; 
• A3 (440 km) Szczecin – Gorzow – Zielona Gora – Legnica – Lubawka; 
• A4 (738 km) Zgorzelec – Wroclaw – Katowice – Krakow – Medyka. 
 
However it soon became clear that this ambitious plan was not realizable and as a 
result the Polish government had to reduce the length of planned roads by 600 km. 
However, this reduction in highway length could not help sufficiently. The severity of 
the problem became clear when it was realized that in order to adapt Polish roads (not 
including motorways) to European standards there was needed up to 2015 about 90 
milliards zlotys, that is to say more than a half of the entire budget of the country. 
Motorway construction would be in addition to this.  
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Figure 3: planned motorways and express roads in Poland. 
Source: Ministry of Infrastructure. 
 
 
The latest plan for the roads and motorways network of Poland 
 
In 1998 the Polish Ministry of Transport and Maritime Economics concluded a 
project entitled “Transport Policy of the Country for 2000–2015; Years for Eco-
development”. The project examined the ways of creating the necessary conditions for 
the integration of the Polish highway transport network with the European network and 
suggested possibilities for improving new technologies for multi-modal transport and 
the construction of European transport chains. It was concluded that 7% of Polish gross 
domestic product a year should be spent upon the development of transport in order to 
achieve these aims within the next 10 years. Contained within the conclusions of the 
project were aims at integrating the Polish economy including building the following 
planned transport networks:4 
 
• the modernization and construction of road and railway networks forming 
part of the Trans-European transport corridors (TINA) including activating a 
programme of raising standards and consolidating road surfaces and bridges; 
• the improvement of the management system for roads and traffic movements 
and improved control of compliance with rules concerning safety of 
highways. 
                                                 
4 Polish Ministry of Infrastructure 
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The programme of constructing road infrastructure in Poland consists of three main 
parts - motorways, express roads and accelerated roads. The aim of the programme is 
the creation of an efficient and effective transport network, including contributions to 
four priority European corridors: 
 
• I Helsinki – Tallinn – Riga – Warsaw. 
• II  Berlin – Warsaw – Minsk – Moscow – Niznyj Nowogrod. 
• III  Berlin – Drezno – Wroclaw – Krakow – Przemysl – Lwow – Kiev. 
• IV  Gdansk – Warsaw – Katowice – Zilina. 
 
As part of the Polish contribution to these networks it was decided to build the three 
following motorways by the year 2015: 
 
• A1 – Gdansk – Torun – Czestochowa. 
• A2 – Swiecko – Poznan – Warszawa – Terespol (on the border with Belarus). 
• A4 – Zgorzelec – Wroclaw – Gliwice – Katowice – Krakow. 
 
However, the plan to build motorway A3 in the near future, the most important 
investment within the western maritime region, was almost immediately interrupted. 
The motorway was to have its beginning in Szczecin and pass by Gorzow, Zielona 
Gora, Legnica and Lubawka to reach the border with the Czech Republic. The 
motorway was subsequently limited to the stretch between Szczecin and the beginning 
of motorway A2 (see Figure 2) and farther on was to be replaced by Express Road S3 
from Zielona Gora. The building of the S3 road should be finished earlier than the 
motorway would have been and the cost of its construction is likely to be lower by 
about 30%. Besides this plan, the building of Express Roads connecting Wroclaw (via 
Poznan) with Bydgoszcz, Bydgoszcz (via Warsaw) with Lublin and the border of the 
country, and the border of Poland with Slovakia (via Krakow, Kielce, Warsaw, 
Bialystok) with the border of Lithuania, is planned according to the transport network 
programme. This key network is to be completed by a number of domestic roads 
amongst others including: Szczecin–Bydgoszcz, Katowice–Kolobrzeg, Gdansk–
Warsaw, and Rzeszow–Bialystok. It is planned to build 1572 km such roads by the end 
of 2015. Earlier it had been the plan to build about 23,000km of such roads but because 
of the shortage of financial resources, this aim was clearly unrealistic. 
During the activities of the project - in the period between 2004 and 2006, and with 
the long-term perspective up to 2008 – there is planned to be realized the following 
tasks:5 
 
• connecting Warsaw with Swiecko and the western border of Poland by 
Motorway A1; 
• connecting Tarnow, Krakow, Katowice and Wroclaw with Germany by 
Motorway A4 and A18 (In Germany Motorways nr 4 and 15); 
                                                 
5 Ibidem. 
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• connecting Gdansk, Grudziadz, Motorway A2, Lodz, Czestochowa with 
the Czech Republic (at Gorzyce) by Motorway A1; 
• modernisation of Motorway A6 from Szczecin to the Polish border at 
Kolbaskowo (with connection with Germany and Motorway nr 11) [plans 
for 2004 and 2005]; 
• building Express Road nr S8 from Warsaw to Wyszkow; 
• building Express Road nr S22 connecting Gdansk with the Polish border at 
Grzechotki (and then onwards to Russia). 
 
In addition it is intended to reconstruct a part of a number of roads in order to adapt 
them to a standard of pressure of 10 tons per axle between 2004 and 2006. The roads to 
be modernized are as follows:6 
 
• nr 1 Torun – Lodz (144 km). 
• nr 2 Warsaw - Terespol (132 km). 
• nr 4 Krakow - Tarnow (56 km). 
• nr 4 Rzeszow - Radzymno (70 km). 
• nr 50 Sochaczew – Mszczonow – Grojec – Minsk Mazowiecki (140 km). 
 
Further developments in the Polish plans include related improved facilities for the 
domestic roads network, which are proposed in the Treaty between Poland and the 
European Union. These include rebuilding roads nr 5, 7, 12 and 17 between 2007 and 
2013. The roads will be adapted to accommodate pressures of 11.5 tons per axle.7 
In order to realize all these aims in the re-building of the highway infrastructure in 
Poland, there is needed a degree of substantially increased financial resources. The 
following sources of finance have been suggested and will be followed up: public 
sources (taxation), planned fuel payments, EU grants and loans; and credits from the 
other international financial institutions. 
The cost of building these 1572 km of roads is about 10bn euro including an average 
price of building 1 km of motorway in Poland of 4.1m to 5m euro. In Silesia, because of 
the damages caused by the mining industry over many decades, the price of 1 km of 
motorway is twice as high. Constructing tolled motorways can help recover these costs 
and also create profits for the operators. According to the USA consulting company 
Wilbur Smith, between 75,000 and 94,000 vehicles a day will use the motorway 
facilities partly dependant upon the price chosen. According to more optimistic 
forecasts it could even be between 15,000 and 22,000 vehicles a day.8 
  Only decisive actions at a political level, particularly in terms of creating 
appropriate financial conditions, will create the basis for realizing these plans for the 
highway network in Poland. An appropriately designed and powerful organizational 
structure will also be needed to activate and direct motorway construction or else little 
will occur. Finally, a sufficiently streamlined and well designed regulatory regime will 
also be important. 
 
                                                 
6 Ibidem. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 Ibidem. 
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The advantages for Poland 
 
The creation of a well developed and appropriate highway network for Poland should 
be a priority for the Polish government and is now essential following membership of 
the European Union. It is motivated by many different and undeniable advantages. In 
particular ensuring the good condition of Polish roads and increasing of number of 
cross-roads free from the possibility of collisions will have a major influence for 
improvement of safety and the reduction in the number of accidents which currently 
occurs. 
Economic advantages also clearly play a very important role. Included among them is 
the activation of international trade, an improvement in the accessibility of particular 
cities and regions, the possibilities for developing new areas for the employment market 
and a general reduction in the time for travel. Development of the road network 
encourages integration between different centres of economic and cultural development 
and increases access to high level services and different branches of industry. 
However, apart from these advantages it is perhaps most necessary to acknowledge 
the transit advantages, both in the range of passenger transport and goods carriers and it 
is here that the links with current and potential ferry operations from Polish ports is 
most apparent. An increase in transit traffic has a clear influence upon the activation of 
development of Polish maritime ports in addition to its impact upon ancillary services 
including amongst others: hotels, gastronomy, fuel suppliers and tourism. It also has a 
significant and beneficial influence upon the development of other branches of industry 
(for example food, clothes) which may be given advantages by additional transit 
facilities encouraged by highway improvements. 
 
 
The Polish motorway network and the ferry shipping sector 
 
In 2005, in Poland two Polish (Polferries and Unity Line) and one Swedish ferry 
company (Stena Line) are operating across the Baltic Sea. Polferries’ services operate 
from Gdansk to Nynashamn (Sweden) and also compete with Unity Line on the line 
from Swinoujscie (Poland) to Ystad in Sweden. The Swedish operator Stena Line serves 
the connection between Gdynia and Karlskrona (Sweden), where two passenger/car 
units and one passenger/car/trailer ferry are in operation.  
These ferry carriers from Poland are mainly attractive for movements in two transport 
corridors which run North–South:9 
 
• Western – connecting Scandinavia and Denmark with Germany and Poland, 
where about 9 million passengers, 2 million cars, more than 1 million trailers 
and more than 130,000 rail wagons are carried each year;  
                                                 
9 ShipPax Statistics 01. The Yearbook for Passenger Shipping Traffic Figures. Halmstad, Sweden 2001, 
s. 83 – 126.  
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• Central - connecting Sweden and Finland with the agglomerations of Gdansk, 
Riga (Latvia) and Klaipeda (Lithuania), where more than 400,000 passengers, 
60,000 cars and 21,000 trailers are carried each year.  
 
The share of Polish ferry operators in the German market is currently very small with 
nearly all carriage on ferries serving Polish ports peripheral in character with limited 
freight transport and tourist traffic. The most important route in this western sector for 
Poland is the connection from Gdynia to Karlskrona in Sweden, on which the 
movement of passengers has increased by about 40% over the last 20 years.  
The biggest role played by ferry shipping in Poland is that connected with marine 
tourism. The most important customers are citizens from Sweden, Finland, Norway and 
Denmark. In last few years the number of passengers arriving from those countries 
increased substantially and with the expansion of the EU, these numbers are bound to 
increase. The number of travellers from Scandinavia to the countries of South Europe 
(for example to Italy, Greece and Spain) has also increased dramatically. In 2004, about 
20% of all inhabitants of the Scandinavian countries crossing Poland traveled to South 
Europe. In all in 2004, there were around 450,000 foreign passengers (mainly from 
Sweden amounting to around 50 % of the total).10  
In recent years the Scandinavian countries have become increasingly more popular 
with travelers from the rest of the European continent as well attracted by the 
environment offered by Norway and Sweden. Every year over 4 million passengers 
travel on ferry lines connecting German and Polish ports with Scandinavia although the 
large majority of these use German ports. Poland is transited only by about 5% of 
passengers from the south of Europe. However, thanks to the integration of Poland with 
the EU, the number of passenger movements via Polish ports is likely to increase 
because of its strategic location lying along the shortest communication routes in a 
North-South direction. 
Within the Polish ferry market two basic groups of passengers can be identified. The 
first of these are residents from Poland who make up about 40% of all ferry passenger 
movements passing through Polish ports.11 Amongst this group it is worth noting:12 
 
• tourists going on vacation to Scandinavian countries and Denmark (mainly in 
the summer season); 
• participants of marine cruises;  
• Polish drivers of trucks and other passengers going to Scandinavia and Denmark 
for business. 
 
The second group consists of foreign passengers making up around 50% of those 
carried. Amongst this group should be noted:13 
 
                                                 
10 Institute of Tourism. 
11 Unity Line. 
12 Urbanyi - Popiołek, I. (1998) Market of ferry shipping in North Europe. The University of Gdansk, 
Sopot. 
13 Ibidem. 
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• Scandinavian and Danish citizens traveling to Poland for vacation (commonly 
with Polish connections with they family living abroad) mainly in the summer 
season; 
• inhabitants of Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Central and South Eastern 
Europe transiting through Poland; 
• foreign drivers of trucks; 
• foreign participants of marine cruises. 
 
The other identifiable group of customers is made up of institutions. Amongst them 
we should mention first of all companies organising conferences and courses for their 
workers on board ferries and also private schools organising different meetings for 
pupils. 
In the case of cargo traffic, Scandinavian countries and Denmark play the key role for 
Polish based ferry shipping. However these countries have only a small share of their 
foreign trade with Poland totaling in terms of exports and imports between 8 and 8.5%. 
Comparing the trade of Poland with these countries, the biggest share – also in terms of 
total exports and imports is with Denmark which has 30% of Polish imports and 32 % 
of exports in 2004. Sweden co-incidentally has the same pattern of trade. Finland is less 
significant with about 29% of Polish imports and 8% exports. The smallest share is with 
Norway with about 9% of imports and 8% exports. Electrical machinery, food, 
chemicals and light industrial goods play the most important role in the structure of 
cargo movements.  
The share of goods trade from the Eastern Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia and 
Estonia remains of little importance in Polish foreign trade with about 2.3% of Polish 
exports and 0.4% of imports14. 
A very important market for Polish based ferry shipping is the transit of general 
cargo. In Polish ports this category represents about 80% of total cargo each year. 
The main countries for Poland with respect to international transit trade are the Czech 
and Slovak Republics. Other countries, which commonly use Poland for transit are: 
Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Romania and Austria (Table 1). Taking into 
consideration the export and import trade of Poland, trade with the Baltic States and 
Baltic Sea transit crossings, the share of Polish based ferry shipping of the general cargo 
trade is about 12%. 
According to various forecasts, the demand for ferry operations from Poland should 
increase as a result of the intensification of international trade between Poland and 
Scandinavia, Denmark and other European Union countries located along the North-
South transport corridor. Passenger movements between these countries will increase 
also. According to the Polish Organization of Tourism, the number of foreign citizens 
arriving in Poland will increase by about 2.5% a year for the next 10 years. This 
increasing trend is also forecast for Polish citizens traveling abroad.15 The growth up to 
2010 is expected to be about 1.9 million passengers, 450,000 cars, 200,000 trailers, 
75,000 rail wagons and from 3.5 to 4.0 million tons of general cargo.16  
 
                                                 
14 Transport – results in 2000 years. GUS, Warsaw 2001. 
15 Tourism in 1998. GUS, Warsaw 1999. 
16 Tubielewicz, A. (ed.) (1994) Forecast of development of container in Port of Gdynia. Technical 
University of Gdansk, Gdansk. 
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Table 1: general cargo transit reloading in Polish ports 1997 [000tons]. 
Gdansk 
Gdynia Szczecin-Swinoujscie Transit 
Countries 
Import Export Total Import Export Total Import Export Total 
Slovakia 3.2 34.3 37.5 9.6 0.7 10.3 7 441 448 
Czech Rep. 2.1 27.7 29.8 8.1 2.0 10.1 8 305 313 
Russia 1.5 0.1 1.6 2.5 1.0 3.5 1 1 2 
Belarus 0 0.9 0.9 - 0.1 0.1 - - - 
Hungary 0.8 - 0.8 0.05 0.04 0.09 - - - 
Lithuania 0.2 - 0.2 - - - - - - 
Latvia - - - - - - - - - 
Ukraine - - - 0.09 0.02 0.11 - - - 
Austria - - - 0.01 - 0.01 - - - 
Estonia - - - - - - 2 - 2 
Luxembourg - - - - - - 0 1 1 
Other Countries - - - 0.05 0.3 0.35 - - - 
Total 7.9 63.0 70.8 20.4 4.16 24.56 18.0 748.0 766 
Source: Anonymous (1999) Bearings for Sea and Trade, Nr 18/1999, p. 14. 
 
Table 2: forecast of passenger and cargo turnover in Polish ports in 2010. 
Specification Swinoujscie Gdansk/Gdynia 
Passengers [thousands] 1000 800-900 
Cars [thousands] 250 180-200 
Trailers [thousands] 180 70 
Rail wagons [thousands] 45 30 
General cargo [millions of tons] 2.8-3.0 0.7-1.2 
Source: Tubielewicz, A. (ed.) (1994) Forecast of development of container in Port of Gdynia, Technical 
University of Gdansk, Gdansk. 
 
In the near future the potential exists for new inland motorway based routes to be 
developed through Poland which will attract traffic away from the Polish ferry sector. 
This is especially the case on the East-West route running from Russia, through the 
Baltic States and Belarus and Poland and on to Germany and Western Europe. Currently 
some of this traffic uses Polish based ferry operators for some of their route (for 
example trucks make great use of the Tallinn-Helsinki ferry operations rather than 
Poland-Finland links because of the problems of transiting Poland). Meanwhile, the 
development of North-South motorway links targeting Polish ports would have a 
dramatic effect upon Polish based ferry operations as it would provide a viable road 
based alternative to the current trend of avoiding Polish ports and using those in 
Germany, Lithuania and beyond which have better road links. Polish ferry carriers will 
continue to have to function under pressure of a developing transport system for some 
years: in other words freight taking land and marine (ferry and ro-ro) services from 
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Moscow, St. Petersburg, Riga and Tallinn traveling via the ports of Finland to West 
Europe avoiding Polish ports. The development of new motorways would make routes 
via Poland more attractive. 
Consequently, in order to develop Polish ferry shipping operations beyond their 
currently limited activities there is a substantial need to build a network of motorways 
and in particular to complete the North-South proposals which remain largely 
unfinished despite a planning period now exceeding 30 years. Sources of finance remain 
the main problem and need to be acquired from other than the Polish state which in the 
foreseeable future will not have the resources to devote to this issue. Grants and loans 
from the EU, income from fuel taxation, and proposals for road pricing and private 
sector investments remain alternatives much talked about but with little progress. 
Without this investment, Polish ferry shipping activities will remain insignificant 
despite Poland’s strategic location and port facilities.  
If we accept the prognosis of the Polish Ministry of Infrastructure, the forecast 
increase of cars and truck/trailer movements in Poland in the next 10 years confirms the 
necessity to build the A1, A2 and A4 motorways in particular. If this does not happen 
we can expect that much of the traffic between the Balkans, South-East Europe, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, the Middle East and Scandinavia/Finland will continue to 
use ferry services across the Baltic which avoid Polish ports and the services that they 
offer. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Without a modern and fully developed motorway system which mirrors that found in 
the established countries of the EU, Poland will have few opportunities for the effective 
functioning and revitalization of its ferry shipping industry which has the potential to 
create wealth and employment for the country. Currently financial problems make the 
construction of these roads and associated ferry facility developments unlikely leading 
to the continued diversion of North-South movements of cargo and passengers to the 
Baltic States and Germany highly probable.  
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Abstract 
 
A methodology for determining optimum cell size for a grid based traffic flow model for 
heterogeneous traffic is proposed in this paper. The cell size is an important factor to determine as it 
affects the computational efficiency and model accuracy. The objective function minimizes three aspects 
namely the difference of distance headway in case of cellular automata and grid based traffic flow model, 
the total number of cells to represent different types of vehicles and multiple of cell width that gives 
closer representation of the different road widths. The presented method is found better then the previous 
attempt which tries to find the cell size by trial and error. 
 
Keywords: Heterogeneous traffic flow; Simulation; Grid based approach; Cellular Automata. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Deciding a cell size is crucial for the cell-based simulation approach. In the present 
study, a systematic approach is given to decide the cell size in cellular automata based 
modelling for heterogeneous traffic flow. In this model, size of the cell is carefully 
decided according to the types of vehicle. It is decided in such a way that it represents 
the actual size of vehicles and the total width of the road as close as possible. The 
physical representation of the vehicle should be kept slightly more than the actual size 
of vehicle to provide some clearance. The cell length also depends upon the dynamic 
characteristics of the vehicular movement, as in the cellular automata, distance-headway 
and speed is considered in terms of number of cells. The cellular automata (CA) traffic 
flow model developed by Nagel and Schreckenberg (1992) is used for comparison of 
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distance headway at different speed. If cell size is taken small, it can represent the 
physical features of vehicles more accurately but at the same time it will reserve the 
huge memory for computation. However, in CA based model, the length of the cell 
affects the dynamic characteristics of vehicle like speed, acceleration, and deceleration. 
This restricts cell size selection unlike the other heterogeneous models developed where 
there is no bar except the computational limitations. Considering all these aspects, the 
maximum possible cell size is decided which gives minimum and maximum desired 
clearance and the dynamic characteristics as close as to NaSch model. 
The optimal cell size selection results in better model performance and satisfies the 
minimal modelling concept. It also gives better physical representation of the vehicle. 
 
 
Background 
 
Several simulation studies for heterogeneous traffic have been conducted in the past 
to capture the mixed nature of traffic flow prevailing in developing countries. These 
studies are different from those models of homogeneous traffic dominated by cars and 
heavy vehicles. These models have to capture the manoeuvres and interactions among 
the various types of vehicle, with varied in dimensions, speed and acceleration 
characteristics. There is a need to further understand these complex interactions. It is 
difficult to get the analytical solution in case of high heterogeneity condition; many 
researchers have used simulation based modelling approach for the heterogeneous 
traffic flow. 
Considerable researches have been conducted for heterogeneous traffic flow in 
developing countries. Many simulation models were developed based on the grid based 
approach. Pillai (1975), Marwah and Ramaseshan (1978), Marwah and Bandyopadhyay 
(1983), Palaniswamy (1983), Isaac (1995), Chalapati (1987), Kumar and Rao (1996), 
and Ramamayya (1988) have developed simulation model for the heterogeneous traffic 
flow. Various cell sizes are taken by different researchers depending on the vehicles 
used for simulation run. However, none of them have given specific procedure for 
deciding cell size. They have used trial and error methods for deciding a cell size. Sing 
(1999) has taken a cell size as 1m x 1m to represent the road stretch. Roy (2000) 
developed a simulation model for the heterogeneous traffic flow. He considered the cell 
size as 0.28 m x 0.28 m considering update periods of 0.1 seconds. Korlapati (2003) has 
taken a similar concept for representing vehicles on the road grid. Gundaliya et al. 
(2004) has taken cell size as 0.9 x 1.9 meters in their simulation models. They have used 
cellular automata for the first time in grid-based approach for various types of vehicles 
including motorised and non-motorised vehicles. Lan and Chang (2004) have developed 
similar model for two wheelers and cars using 1.25 x 1.25 meters cell size.  
The cell size decided in the above studies is based on the vehicle types. They have 
taken the cell size based on the vehicle types and the accuracy of the model 
performance. No specific guideline is given for determining the cell size in most of the 
cases. If the cell size is taken small, the model accuracy for the physical representation 
is high. However, the time taken for the simulation is increased. Singh (1999) has 
suggested that the cell size should be decided based on the computational criteria as 
well as lateral and longitudinal clearance of the vehicle. Hence, in the present study, a 
systematic approach is developed for determining optimal cell size for the 
heterogeneous traffic flow model using genetic algorithm. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 29 (2005): 71-79 
 73
Methodology 
 
In the grid-based traffic simulation model road is divided into a number of uniform 
cells. The vehicles are then physically represented on the grid as per their sizes. The 
physical representation of the vehicles in the single lane is shown in Fig. 2. The vehicles 
then move according to the model criteria taken. In the present study the model 
developed by Gundaliya et al. (2004) is taken to formulate the objective function for 
optimum size of cell of the grid. The model developed by Gundaliya et al. (2004) and 
Lan and Chang (2004) have used CA concept to update the vehicle position. However, 
the cell size was decided based on type of vehicles. In these models speed is termed as 
number of cells per time-step. Hence, 1 cell/time-step means that vehicle advances 1 
cell length in one time step. Therefore, the cell size also plays a key role for vehicle 
dynamics and model accuracy in these types of models. 
A minimization problem is formulated considering headway distance, total number of 
cells and road width. The first term in the objective function  
(Eq. 1) represents the headway difference such that the model reacts similar to the 
NaSch basic model at all the cell speeds. Hence, as per NaSch model, the speed is taken 
from 1 to 5 cells / time-step. According to CA, the minimum headway required is the 
number of cells ahead of the vehicles as per the vehicle speed. This headway is fixed in 
the case of NaSch model for each speed as shown in column 6 of Table 2. The 
difference between these headways will be compared with that of grid-based model at 
the same speed for the given cell. Minimum difference indicates that the model closely 
represents the dynamic characteristics of NaSch model. The second term in objective 
function represents the total number of cells of different types of vehicles. The third 
term represents the difference between the actual width of the road and the width 
obtained by multiplying number of cells with width of each cell. This objective function 
is subjected to following constraints. The constraints (Eq. 2 and Eq. 3) ensure that all 
the vehicle types are having clearance within the limits of desired minimum and 
maximum clearance. Constraints (Eq. 4 and Eq. 5) take care of cell length and width 
such that it is always positive. 1C , 2C , and 3C  are the appropriate constant weights for 
all three objectives in Eq. 1. 
 
 
∑×=
= ×−×
5
1
2
) 5.7(1),( 
i
cc LddWL c
G
i
N
iCfMin ∑ ××+ =
K
k
L
k
W
k ddC
1
2  
 
2)(3 W jW cd nLiC −××+  (1)
Subjected to  
KCCC llkl ∀<< maxmin  (2)
KCCC wwkw ∀<< maxmin  (3)
0>Lc  (4)
0>W c  (5)
  
  
  
  
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 29 (2005): 71-79 
 74
Where  
)(
c
N
c
L
LN
i
G
i dd ×=  (6)
   
W
Wd
c
j
i
Ln =  
(7)
)( LkLc
W
kdC
l
k −×=  (8)
)( W kW c
L
kd
l
kC −×=  (9)
G
id ,
N
id ,
W
kd ,
L
kd ,
Ln
kd  are integers indicating number of cells.  
 
N
id  is the distance headway at speed i considering NaSch model, 
G
id is the 
distance headway at speed i  considering cell size of Grid based model, Wkd  is the 
width of vehicle type k, Lkd  is the length of vehicle type k , 
Ln
kd  is the width of 
lane ( j ) considering Lc , where Lc  is optimum cell length in meters, Ln  is total 
number of lanes of width W j in meter of lane ( j ), Lk  is the length of vehicle-type k  
in meters, W k  is the width of vehicle-type k  in meters, 
N
cL  is the cell length in meters 
taken as 7.5 meter (NaSch model), W c is the optimum cell width in meters, 
l
kC  is the 
clearance of vehicle type k  in meters (lengthwise), C
w
k  is the clearance of vehicle type 
k in meters (width wise), C
l
min  is the minimum lengthwise clearance in meters, 
C
w
min  is the minimum widthwise clearance in meters, C
l
max  is maximum allowed 
lengthwise clearance in meters, C
w
max  is maximum allowed widthwise clearance in 
meters, and K is total number of type of vehicle. 
 
The above function is having number of variables and constraints, which are of 
conflicting nature. Hence, a Genetic Algorithm is used to solve the problem. The 
objective is to minimize the total square meter for the best representation of cells in grid 
based modelling approach. 
 
 
Genetic algorithm 
 
Genetic algorithms (GAs) are a family of computational models inspired by evolution 
(Goldberg, 1989). These algorithms encode a potential solution to a specific problem on 
a simple chromosome-like data structure and apply recombination of parameters 
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(reproduction, crossover, and mutation) to these structures for storing critical 
information. GAs are often viewed as function optimizers, although the ranges of 
problems to which GAs have been applied are quite broad. An implementation of GAs 
begins with a population of (typically random) chromosomes, then evaluates these 
structures and allocates reproductive opportunities in such a way that those 
chromosomes that represents a better solution to the target problem are given more 
chances to ‘reproduce’ than those chromosomes, which are poorer solutions. The 
’goodness’ of a solution is typically defined with respect to the current population. The 
working principle of a GAs is illustrated in Fig. 1. The major steps involved are the 
generation of a population of solutions, finding the objective function and fitness 
function and the application of genetic operators. In the present study a cell length and 
cell width are taken as function variables and the optimum function value is obtained. 
This methodology is explained in the subsequent section. 
 
 
/* GENETIC ALGORITHM  */ 
formulate initial population 
randomly initialize population 
repeat 
evaluate objective function with the constraint penalties 
find fitness function 
apply genetic operators 
reproduction 
crossover 
mutation 
until stopping criteria 
 
Figure 1:working principle of genetic algorithm. 
 
The GA parameters are tuned to get the near optimum solution to determine the cell 
size which satisfies the constraints. The total chromosome length is taken as 30 units for 
representing the cell size variable, length and width. Poll size is taken as 40 units and 
crossover rate and mutation rate is found to be 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. The libGA 
software is used for getting near optimum solution for determining cell size. 
 
 
Case study 
 
In this simulation model, seven types of vehicles differing in size have been 
considered as shown in Table 1. These seven types of vehicles are again classified as 
per their dynamic characteristics like maximum speed, acceleration etc.. Therefore, non-
motorised vehicles like bicycle, bullock-cart, and pedal rickshaws can be considered by 
selecting appropriate size and dynamic characteristics. This problem has been solved 
using Genetic Algorithm. To restrict search area for the width and length of cell the 
search window is given for width as 0.9 to 1.0 meter and length as 1.0 to 2.2 meter. The 
distance headway for the NaSch model is taken as shown in column 7 of Table 2 for 
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each speed option. The minimum clearances assumed for this problem are: C
l
min =0.1 
meters, C
w
min =0.1 meters, C
l
max =1.2 meters and C
w
max =1.0 meters. 
 
Table 1: type of vehicle and dimension details taken for the study. 
Sr.No Vehicle Type Width (meter) Length (meter) 
1 2W 0.6 1.8 
2 3W 1.4 2.6 
3 Car 1.7 4.7 
4 LCV1 1.9 5 
5 LCV2 1.9 6.8 
6 HCV1 2.5 8.5 
7 HCV2 2.5 10.3 
 
Table 2: speed and distance headway for different discrete models. 
Speed in GBTFM 
(0.9 x 1.9 meters) 
NaSch(CA-7.5) 
c/ts Speed 
(kmph) 
Headway 
(meters) 
Speed 
(kmph) 
Headway 
(meter) 
(1) (2) (3) (6) (7) 
1 6.84 1.9 27 7.5 
2 13.68 3.8 54 15 
3 20.52 5.7 81 22.5 
4 27.36 7.6 108 30 
5 34.2 9.5 135 37.5 
6 41.04 11.4 - - 
7 47.88 13.3 - - 
8 54.72 15.2 - - 
9 61.56 17.1 - - 
10 68.4 19 - - 
11 75.24 20.9 - - 
12 82.08 22.8 - - 
13 88.92 24.7 - - 
14 95.76 26.6 - - 
15 102.6 28.5 - - 
16 109.44 30.4 - - 
17 116.28 32.3 - - 
18 123.12 34.2 - - 
19 129.96 36.1 - - 
20 136.8 38 - - 
 
Where 2W stands for two wheelers, 3W for three wheelers, HCV1 for heavy 
commercial vehicle type 1, HCV2 for heavy commercial vehicle type 2, LCV1 for light 
commercial vehicle type 1, and LCV2 for light commercial vehicle type 2.  
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Total type of lanes considered as Ln  is a two-lane road of 7.0 meters width. The 
single lane length is taken as W1 = 3.6 meters and two lane width is taken as W 2 = 7.0 
meters. In the present study, the weightings of all three constants are taken as equal and 
hence the value for 1C , 2C , and 3C are the same. The values of C1, C2, and C3 can be 
taken as different giving appropriate weightings to the terms in the objective functions. 
The GA converged after 130 iterations and cell size found as 0.9 meters as width and 
1.9 meters as length. The closeness of distance headway of grid based model and NaSch 
model is given in Table 2. However, this cell size will change as the new vehicles with 
different sizes are added as well as the minimum and maximum clearance is changed. In 
the present study the cell size is taken as 0.9 meters and 1.9 meters for the vehicle under 
consideration.  
The dynamic characteristics of the vehicle speed and the minimum distance headway 
required for the one-second time-step are shown in column 2 and 3 of Table 2 for cell 
length of 1.9 meters. The cell size is decided based on the different vehicle types and 
other considerations discussed earlier.  
 
Figure 2: physical representation of vehicles on single lane road. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The above-formulated problem has been used to find out the optimum cell size for the 
vehicle types given in Table 1 for the grid based traffic flow modelling. After deciding 
the cell size, the length and width of the vehicle in terms of number of cells can be 
obtained by adding clearance to the vehicle's actual length and width. After deciding the 
size of the vehicle in terms of number of cells in lateral and longitudinal, vehicle can be 
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physically represented on occupied number of cells. This physical representation of the 
vehicle in the single lane is shown in Fig 2. The left most corner of the each vehicle 
represents the position of the vehicle in each time-step. Column 2 of Table 3 shows 
vehicle type, column 3 and 4 show vehicle actual dimensions of width and length taken 
in model in meters respectively, column 5 and 6 show the dimensions of vehicles in 
width and length of vehicles in cells, column 7 and 8 are width and length of vehicle 
representation taken in present study in meters and column 9 and 10 show the minimum 
clearance on width and length in meters. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The methodology developed is useful to define the optimum cell size, which 
represents the vehicles as the nearest as the actual size in terms of number of cells. 
Moreover it also represents the number of lanes as a multiple of cell width as close as 
possible. The objective function also takes care of dynamic characteristics of the 
vehicles where the vehicles gaps are represented in terms of number of cells. However, 
it needs to decide the weightage of all three objectives numerically, which can be 
universally applied for any type of function. The methodology applied here is for 
deciding cell size for the seven different categories of the vehicles. This method is 
further useful to define the cell size in case of heterogeneous traffic flow particularly 
where vehicles move forward according to the principle of CA based simulation. 
 
Table 3: Vehicle dimensions details with cell size (0.9 x 1.9 meters). 
Actual  
(meters) 
Taken in model 
(cells) 
Taken in model 
(meters) 
Clearance 
(meters) 
S.No  
 
 
 
Vehicl
e type  
 
 
Width  Length  Width Length Width Length Width Length 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1 2W 0.6 1.8 1 1 0.9 1.9 0.3 0.1 
2 3W 1.4 2.6 2 2 1.8 3.8 0.4 1.2 
3 Car 1.7 4.7 2 3 1.8 5.7 0.1 1 
4 LCV1 1.9 5 3 3 2.7 5.7 0.8 0.7 
5 LCV2 1.9 6.8 3 4 2.7 7.6 0.8 0.8 
6 HCV1 2.5 8.5 3 5 2.7 9.5 0.2 1 
7 HCV2 2.5 10.3 3 6 2.7 11.4 0.2 1.1 
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